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Abstract
This thesis studies the effect of hardware dimensional variation and the methods used to cope
with it in the final assembly of Boeing 777 airplanes. It shows that:
* manufacturing process capability, assembly constraints, and integration risk were not
adequately considered in the design of engineering tolerances.
* customer-supplier incentives are often misaligned along the manufacturing channel causing
variation to be knowingly passed downstream.
* insufficient planning for corrective action occurred in the design stage.
* it takes tremendous effort to analyze and correct problems once they reach final assembly.
The result is a manufacturing process that is statistically incapable of meeting engineering
tolerances and hence must rely upon inspection and rework in order to meet the strict quality
requirements demanded of the final product. Accepted norms incite that variation be washed
into areas where it remains undetected until latent stages of assembly. In final assembly the
problems caused by upstream hardware variation are extremely difficult to analyze and correct
because of the distance from the source and because existing structures were not designed in
anticipation of them.
The need for corrective action is driven largely by Boeing's uncompromising standard of
perfection. After inspection and rework the product delivered to a final customer is virtually
flawless. The superb quality that characterizes a Boeing 777, however, comes at a manufacturing
cost that could be significantly lower. The thesis makes several general recommendations to
accomplish the goal of lowered cost through improvements in existing processes and design
considerations for future generation airplanes.
The study utilized a "hands-on" case approach to an actual assembly problem to analyze the
effects of hardware dimensional variation, organizational dynamics, corrective action processes,
and hardware measurement systems. The immediate project goal was to add value to Boeing 777
Division in terms of cost, quality, delivery, and customer satisfaction.
From the specific case, insights were gained concerning general factors that caused the problem
and prevailed against a root cause solution. The premise of this approach is that the greatest
learning about an organization's deeply held values and unstated assumptions can be obtained
when one tries to change something. Areas of strong resistance may indicate places where
entrenched beliefs are rooted. Armed with an "insider's" perspective it is possible to identify
high leverage opportunities that are not visible to an "outsider".
During the last third of the internship an assembly model called Datum Flow Chain (DFC)
analysis was utilized to compare the actual method of technical problem solving used to that
which might have been achievable using DFC. The DFC analysis revealed consistent datuming
for the problem in question (section 44 body panel aft skin edge station) and uncovered an
inconsistency with respect to frame stationing. This demonstrates the value of the DFC as a tool
to identify potential assembly problems during product and process design before production
operations begin.
Competent follow through by 777 Process Engineering brought to the surface the fallacy of a
basic assumption about the accuracy of Boeing tools and tooling surveys. Their work reconciles
several disturbing questions that were unanswered when the internship ended. The general lack
of sensitivity to measurement uncertainty is a pervasive problem along the entire manufacturing
channel.
Thesis Advisors:
Professor Roy Welsch, Sloan School of Management
Dr. Daniel E. Whitney. Department of Mechanical Engineering
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Disclaimer Statement
Airplanes in Boeing 777 final assembly are identified by an airplane effectivity' number and a
line number. Effectivity numbers convey configuration information and are of the form WA001,
for example, which corresponds to line number 1, the first 777 built. Line numbers are unique
sequential assignments to identify an airplane's relative position within the planned airplane
production order. Trend analyses are performed with airplanes sequenced according to line
numbers.
Airline customers order specific line numbers before they are built and a detailed Customer
Inspection Process constitutes an integral part of the airplane production cycle. On site customer
representatives, or their designees, are included in meetings and participate in planned
inspections of aircraft assemblies, installations, and closures. Customers are apprised of any
significant rework necessary to ensure that Boeing's strict quality assurance requirements are
met.
This thesis is concerned with corrective action due to component variability that is inherent
within any production process. Measurement data and information concerning rework are
presented to allow a manufacturing systems analysis of a specific problem. Line numbers are
disguised because of the risk of misinterpretation of the information if applied outside of the
intended context. Chronological sequencing is retained but two dummy structures (actual line
numbers S/T and F/T for static test and fatigue test, respectively) are inserted into the data series
to preclude association of plotted data with a line number by counting the number of data points
from the beginning. Disguised line numbers remain consistent throughout the document.
Appendix 6 contains a glossary of Boeing specific terms, acronyms, and definitions.
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1. Chapter 1 - Introduction
The author was assigned to a six month internship with the Process Engineering (PE) Group of
Boeing 777 Division's Final Assembly Plant in Everett, WA. At the time of the author's arrival
in June of 1997 the factory was completing assembly of the ninetieth2 777. By the time the
internship ended an additional forty airplanes had been produced and line number (I/N) 130 was
being completed.
Process Engineering is a team of 22 engineers who report to the factory manager through Wencil
McClenahan. the Process Engineering manager, but they are functionally part of the Body
Structures Manufacturing Business Unit (MBU). The charter of PE is to apply structured
engineering principles to the resolution of airplane manufacturing problems. There are other
groups whose charter it is to resolve manufacturing problems but PE is unique in that they are
more removed from the operational mainstream and that they apply analytical tools to
characterize the manufacturing process as a system that produces airplanes.
In his book The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge proposes that there are multiple levels of
explanation in any complex situation as depicted by the following diagram 3:
Systemic Structure (generative)
Patterns of Behavior (responsive)
Events (reactive)
2 These approximate line numbers are the only actual ones given in the thesis. This is to give the reader a sense for
777 cumulative production and rate.
Page 52.
Event explanations are the most common in contemporary culture and pervasive in
manufacturing corrective action organizations. Senge acknowledges that current reality (such as
meeting airplane delivery requirements at Boeing) may require reactive behavior (symptomatic
solutions) and that in such instances groups that are apart from the everyday mainstream (e.g. 777
Process Engineering) are particularly useful devices to move to higher leverage solutions.
Pattern of behavior explanations focus on identification of longer term trends and thus begin to
break the stronghold of reactive thinking. In the structural explanation one seeks to identify what
causes the patterns of behavior. The structural, or systems level approach is the least common
yet most powerful because it recognizes that structure produces behavior which in turn causes
events. Thus events are distributed outputs of the underlying system. The emphasis of Process
Engineering is to break away from the focus on events in order to affect problem solutions at a
fundamental (root cause) level.
The Process Engineering approach is often in diametric conflict with accepted norms. In the
latter view,. each airplane is unique and problems are solved as though they were isolated events.
Plant information, measurement, incentive, and data systems reinforce this view and the
organization has tremendous competence in the application of "fire-fighting" methodologies.
The approach is pragmatic and often appropriate but an unfortunate consequence is that it is
myopic and results in embedded workarounds and institutionalized rework practices. These have
become so entrenched that few recognize a systemic pattern of symptomatic problem solving
with attendant side effects and atrophy of fundamental solution skills.
The purpose of discussing structural influences on behavior and events at this point is to lay the
foundation for a premise that under-girds the thesis. Boeing's system of developing and building
airplanes is designed to give the exact results that are being obtained: the best airplanes in the
world, delivered on time, at an extremely high manufacturing cost.
The internship was initially undefined with respect to a specific manufacturing issue. The only
firm requirement was that it study hardware variability corrective action. After several weeks in
the factory the following goals were agreed upon:
* Identify and exploit a hardware variability reduction opportunity with real time cost, quality,
and delivery consequences.
* Develop an insider's understanding of critical issues that hinder hardware variability control
(HVC) in 777 manufacturing.
* Apply the specific learning gleaned from above to develop general recommendations to
improve the existing corrective action process.
1.1 Thesis Chapter Overview
This thesis contains the following:
* In Chapter 1, an introduction.
* In Chapter 2. an overview of 777 final assembly and top level airplane requirements.
* In Chapter 3, a description of the relevant assembly process and the case study
problem.
* In Chapter 4, a description of the steps taken to diagnose the problem using in-place
systems.
* In Chapter 5. an analysis of the problem using local measurements.
* In Chapter 6, an analysis using datum flow diagrams.
* In Chapter 7, a discussion of results and additional follow up with Boeing since the
internship.
* In Chapter 8, conclusions and recommendations.
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2. Chapter 2 - 777 Final Assembly and Top Level Airplane Requirements
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents the background information for the internship project. It begins with a
discussion of the 777 program and describes several considerations that make it unique. This is
followed by an overview of the 777 final assembly factory and the top level airplane
requirements that describe hardware characteristics demanded of the final product.
2.2 The 777 Airplane Program
The 777 program was developed in response to airline customer interest in a Boeing airplane that
would have a passenger capacity between that of the 767-300 and the 747-400. After several
years of assessing market preferences and conducting feasibility studies Boeing announced the
launch of the 777 into production in October 1990. The design is based on market needs and
customer preferences resulting in superior cabin spaciousness and flexibility, enhanced
reliability, and lower operating costs than its competitors (The Airbus A330 and A340 and the
McDonnell Douglas MD- 11).
In addition to obtaining significant customer input, Boeing followed a design process that was
different from that of previous generation airplanes. The key attributes of this process included:
* Co-located Design Build Teams (DBT) - Personnel from engineering and manufacturing
were physically located near one another to facilitate a more coherent interface between the
two groups and a more robust design.
* Concurrent Product Definition (CPD) - Engineering activities were integrated such that
releases occurred only once and on time.
* 100% Digital Product Definition (DPD) - Tubing, wiring, blankets, cabling, system
attachment points and production illustrations were developed entirely in a digital
environment.
* Digital Pre-assembly (DPA) - Aircraft parts were modeled in three dimensions and assembly
was simulated in advance of production on computer.
* Integrated Work Statement (IWS) - An evolving statement of the detailed parts, assemblies,
installations, plans, and tools that comprised the design was developed.
* Hardware Variability Control (HVC) - A focused method of improving aircraft assembly
operations that involved identification of key interfaces was utilized.
Boeings efforts on the 777 seem to be fruitful and the program is replete with success stories and
world records. On schedule in 1994 and 1995, the first 777s were flown and delivered with no
prototype. A 777 established a Great Circle Distance Without Landing record by flying 12,255
statute miles and later the same aircraft completed a record setting world circumnavigation. The
777-300 is the longest commercial jetliner in the world and the Everett production facility is the
largest building in the world. Customers are delighted too. In July of 1997, when the 100th 777
was being built, orders for 323 airplanes had already been received. This gives the 777 a
formidable 67 percent of its market while its three competitors share the remaining 33 percent.
2.3 Overview of 777 final assembly
The Boeing 777 final assembly plant in Everett, WA employees 3000 people and rolls out an
airplane every three or four days depending upon the planned production rate. A strong sense of
respect for time pervades the organization. Schedule compliance is heavily emphasized and the
importance of meeting delivery commitments is stressed at all levels. Meetings, appointments,
shifts. and major crane and airplane movements begin and end crisply and on time. When this
fails to occur. for whatever reason, there is sensitivity to the fact that an important and deeply
held value is compromised.
The 777 has over one hundred and fifty thousand unique engineered parts (in addition to over
two and one half million fasteners) supplied by internal and external vendors. All work in the
factory takes place in dedicated shops known as control codes which are abbreviated CC
followed by a number that identifies their function (for example CC335 is responsible for
assembly of the wing center section). Everett integrates body, wing, and empennage sub sections
and performs ten major fuselage joins (see section 2.3.1 and Appendix 1). The last two joins
occur in final body join (FBJ or CC131) where the forward (section 41/43) and aft body (section
46/47/48) sections are joined to the wing center stub (section 44). In FBJ, the factory bottleneck,
the airplane takes the appearance of the finished structure.
Boeing's uncompromising standard of perfection, extremely tight dimensional tolerances,
regulatory requirements, and the enormous number of critical interfaces give frequent rise to the
need for corrective action 4 due to inherent variation. Some problems are single events with an
identifiable cause and others are due to variation in major body structures for which the part-to-
part fit is not observable until the sections meet at FBJ. The latter depends on the interaction of
several variables and often occurs at a great distances from the source. In such cases diagnosis is
very difficult because of technical and human factors, the former of which is often easier to
address. Low airplane production rates (compared to automobiles or photographic pack film for
example). type and quality of data, organizational and cultural complexity, measurement and
incentive systems, and a myriad of other factors combine to militate against root cause analysis
and resolution. The following sections discuss the 777 final assembly process.
2.3.1 777 Major Body Section Joins
Ten major body joins are performed (see Appendix 1) on completed body sections to produce a
finished 777 airplane (Appendix 2 shows the 777 manufacturing assembly sequence). Body
sections are built on site in Everett "back shops" from subassembly panels supplied by internal
and external vendors (see Appendix 3 for a 777 make buy diagram). Body joins, or simply joins,
are best described as the bringing together of two cylindrical sections of fuselage (or a wings to
the center stub) and fastening them into either a stove-pipe or butt joint coupling. In final body
join (see Appendix 4 for a factory layout) the forward and aft body sections are joined to the
wing center section in stove-pipe connections. These are called the forward join and the aft join,
respectively.
4 Corrective action means exactly that. Any condition that could affect airplane safety, service life, operating costs,
or mainmtainability are resolved before the airplane is delivered. Anything requiring corrective action is reviewed by
QA. Engineering. and Manufacturing in a formal process that ensures that the product is not compromised with
respect to these requirements.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology students Mantripragada and Adams studied the forward
join in 1996. Their work in Everett was followed by site visits to Kawasaki Heavy Industries
(KHI) in Japan during January of 1997 and resulted in three unpublished Boeing Proprietary
reports (maintained by the MIT Fast and Flexible Manufacturing Project). An effort is made to
apply their methodologies and lessons learned to the aft join.
2.3.2 Line Moves
An airplane moves into final body join when a "line move" occurs (during the internship this was
every third manufacturing [M] day). The move begins at the end of second shift when factory
traffic is low. The synchronization of activities involving large numbers of personnel, cranes,
and airplane structures occurring rapidly and safely impresses one that Boeing has military-like
competence in these areas.
A completely assembled airplane 'rolls out" of the factory from one of the slant positions
(Appendix 4 shows six airplanes in slant positions. Airplanes leave the factory through large bay
doors where the numbers 40-25 and 40-26). Jobs scheduled for completion that remain open at
the time of a line move become "travelers". These are carried over into downstream workstations
until they are closed out. Throughout the manufacturing channel uncompleted jobs normally do
not delay a line move because of the ability to "travel" work to the next control code. After
leaving the factory airplanes go to paint, fuel, and flight operations.
Roll out of an airplane creates a vacancy in one of the slant positions which is filled by an
airplane from an upstream slant position. After several airplanes are moved there is a vacancy
for the airplane in final body join to fill. The airplane leaving final body join rolls for the first
time into the nearest slant position. FBJ now has room to accept delivery of the landing gear and
body structures. These are lifted in place by crane. The center section is located and becomes
the monument. Forward and after bodies are lifted in place and laser targets are installed in
preparation for joining and alignment of the airplane sections. Vacancies are created upstream in
the "back shops" where cranes load panel assemblies to begin the build cycle of the next set of
body structures.
2.3.3 The Final Body Join Laser Alignment System
An oft cited success of the 777 program is the fact that aircraft alignment from forward to aft is
better than any other airplane in the world. This means that the 777 is straighter from nose to tail
than previous generation airplanes. This achievement is attributed to the implementation of
Hardware Variability Control (HVC) and the use of a laser alignment system. A detailed
discussion of this system is beyond the scope of the thesis but data from it are presented and





airplane requirements are identified on a Boeing drawing known as the airplane












* Contour, alignment of folding wing
Wing/Body Fairing:





* Normal to section 48
General:
* Uniform gaps, fair of doors
Wings:
* Frame station values
* Cargo handling system operational
* Interior alignment
* Fit, form, and function of all I/R (interchangeable and replaceable) items
In Figure 2.1 station [STA] is the perpendicular distance in inches from the nose of the airplane
to a point aft; waterline [WL] is the vertical distance from ground level in inches; and buttock
line [BL] is the distance in inches to the left or right from the airplane centerline. Datums are
reference points, lines, or planes from which other locations are measured and indexes are
hardware surfaces on either a tool or the airplane from which a part is physically located. Two
important considerations in the 777 program were the choice of WL and BL datums. The left
buttock line [LBL] 11.00 seat track and WL 200.00 were selected because these datums also
serve as indexes from which other parts can be located. This is in contrast to a situation where
the datum is a point in space without a corresponding hard surface. In this case part locations
would be measured from one point but physically located from another resulting in accumulated
variation. The 777 airplane is both measured and built around LBL 11.00 and WL 200.00 which
helps to ensure that top level requirements are met. Station indexes and datums depend on the
particular airplane section because, unlike LBL 11.00 and WL 200.00, there is no single station
line that is common to all sections of the airplane from nose to tail.
Top level requirements necessarily impose requirements on the body structures that make up the
airplane. For example, the integrated structure cannot be straight if component body sections are
built in such a way that they cannot be joined in a straight line. This fact gives rise to the concept
of "flow-down". Top level requirements determine the requirements that must be met by the
next lower assembly to ensure that the top level requirement will be satisfied.
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Figure 2.1 Top level airplane requirements
2.4.1 Key Characteristics
Top level airplane requirements determine the key characteristics (KCs) for airplane interface
and assembly. KCs are "attributes or features (dimensions or specifications) of a part, assembly,
installation, or system in which variation from nominal has the most adverse effect upon fit,
performance, or service life5". Flowdown of top level requirements establishes KCs for major
joins and subassembly builds that occur at FBJ and in backshops, respectively.
Lower level KCs are of two types: those which flow down from a higher, and those which exist
for assembly purposes within the given shop. Cunningham and Whitney6 refer to these as
product and assembly KCs (PKCs and AKCs, respectively) and show that the risk of error upon
integration of apparently properly made elements can be estimated and, hence, controlled by
introducing proper metrics during the product design stage.
2.4.2 Impact of internship on factory performance
A goal of the internship was to complete a project that would have immediate cost, quality, and
delivery consequences. The reasons for this approach are best summarized by Edgar Schein who
states in his book Organizational Culture and Leadership that "one can understand a system best
by trying to change it...culture will not reveal itself that easily and one must actively intervene to
determine where stable rituals, espoused values, and basic shared assumptions are located...some
of the most important things I learned about cultures [of companies I studied] surfaced only as
reactions to my intervention efforts7 ." In part three of the book he gives methods to study and
interpret culture and states that when studying culture for the purpose of reporting to outsiders (as
is the case here) a very useful approach is to "adopt a clinical perspective, attempt to be helpful
to the organization." Further, the process of bringing culture to the surface "requires
considerable investment of time and energy on the part of the insider [Boeing employees in this
case] and hence is more likely to be successful if the insiders are also attempting to solve their
own problems. If the deciphering is done purely as a research process where the outsider
attempts to get permission to observe and talk to insiders, she or he will not get the level of
cooperation and motivation needed...on the other hand, if the researcher has enough time to
Hardware Variability Control, Student Manual for Existing Design, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 1994.
6 Cunningham. Timothy W.; Whitney, Daniel E., The Chain Metrics Method for Identifying Integration Risk During
Concept Design, submitted to ASME DTM 1998.
7 Edgar H. Schein describes the clinical research model in his book Organizational Culture and Leadership, page 30.
become an accepted and helpful part of the group, the process can work because the insiders will
then become motivated to help the researcher. "
It is easy to make recommendations when one is not responsible for carrying them out. Without
sensitivity to human and cultural implications, recommendations such as "reduce rework" or
"focus on customer satisfaction" are of little value. Given this premise, the value of any
suggestions resulting from the internship is enhanced by association with a hands on
implementation.
For these reasons the strategy of the internship was to directly impact cost, schedule, and quality
and then leverage the lessons learned during the corrective action process into broader
generalizations that could be useful in other areas. The next chapter describes the specific
problem that was addressed during the internship in order to accomplish this goal.
8Pages 169-171.
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3. Chapter 3 - Description of Section 44 Body Panel Excess Length
Problem
This chapter begins with a discussion of the section 44 assembly process and associated key
characteristics from the vendor to final body join. Following the introductory material is a
description of the hardware variability problem that was identified and diagnosed during the
internship resulting in a change to the vendor's process.
3.1 Section 44 Assembly Process
This section describes the measurement and assembly processes for section 44, also referred to as
the wing center section.
3.1.1 Measurement systems in use
Measurements are taken before, during, and after each assembly stage and fall into one of three
broad categories:
* Quality Assurance (QA) measurements - performed by trained and dedicated inspectors. QA
requirements are directive in nature. Failure to obtain QA approval on a required inspection
generates a non-conformance reject tag (NCR) resulting in a material review board (MRB) 9
and possible rework and production delays.
* Hardware Variability Control (HVC) measurements - performed by shop personnel in
conjunction with their other responsibilities. Out of tolerance HVC measurements do not
automatically generate rework or MRB as do problems with QA. How seriously HVC
measurements are taken, if they are taken at all, depends on the level of Process Engineering
interaction with the shop and the perceived value of the measurements to the shop.
* Informal measurements - do not fall into the category of QA or HVC. "Informals" can be
taken by anyone who is interested in the information they might provide. The informal
measurements are non-directive in nature but can be a powerful tool for process improvement
given current shortcomings of HVC.
9 See Appendix 6 for definitions.
3.1.2 Key Characteristics for The 44-46 Join Process
Top level requirements of Figure 2.1 are used to determine the KCs for the aft join. These are
shown below in Figure 3.1. Seat track station gap was discontinued as an HVC item (UN 343);
QA approval, however, is still required for this feature. Differences between QA and HVC KC
requirements are discussed further in Section 5.2.1.
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Figure 3.1 Key Characteristics for the aft join
Five HVC KCs are monitored at FBJ (this is true for both the forward and aft joins.
Mantripragada and Adamslo studied the forward join). Six FBJ KCs are listed below but note
that the second of these was suspended on airplane number 22:
1. Waterline (WL) 200 alignment (KC.I.131.1) is a top level key characteristic (datum A in
Figure 2.1). The WL 200 datum flows down from the AIP to CC131 and to backshops
(CC315 for section 41/43; CC325 for section 46; CC328 for section 46/47/48; and CC335 for
section 44) to establish and maintain WL throughout the build cycle. Final verification is
performed by laser alignment at FBJ (Figure 5.7). Herein is a principle advantage to
choosing WL200 as both the primary WL datum and index. All airplane body sections are
measured and built to the same common reference plane. When the body sections are aligned
in downstream joining operations, other airplane features on the sections are much more
likely to also line up due to the common datum and indexing scheme.
o Krish Mantripragada and Jeff Adams, Boeing Trip Report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996
2. Seat track LBL 11 (KC.1.131.3) was suspended on line number 22. The LBL 11 seat track
(datum B in Figure 2.1) is used to build a straight airplane. That is, since LBL 11 is the BL
datum and index for the entire airplane, then if LBL 11 is straight, the airplane should also be
straight. As with KC.1.131.1, LBL 11 flows down from the AIP to FBJ and to back shops.
KC. 1 .131.3 was suspended because of tool problems. Moreover, skin edge and seat track gap
best fitting" practices were thought to compromise the data in terms of process feedback to
build areas. This occurred because QA requirements supercede those imposed by HVC. QA
rejection tags are written against non-conforming seat track station gaps and body panel skin
gaps. but not for airplane straightness. An out of tolerance condition for gap features results
in rework and production delays but slight adjustments in airplane alignment do not. Unless
two adjacent body sections are perfect it is not possible to have the airplane exactly straight
and also have uniform and even gaps everywhere' 2. If LBL 11 is not straight it might be
because the seat track itself is at an angle or because the section is joined at an angle to
ensure that all gap tolerances are met. In practice, seat track and skin gaps are used as
proxies for airplane straightness and airplane alignment is then checked with the laser
alignment system resulting in a "best fit" compromise. Laser alignment is discussed in
Section 5.2.3 and BL alignment data are shown in Figure 5.8.
3. Inside skin surface (ISS; KC.1.131.4) is used during body section buildup and does not flow
down from the AIP. This KC is used to ensure proper contour integration of the fore and aft
stovepipe joints of the fuselage sections (see Mantripragada and Adams, Boeing trip report).
4. Keel beam interface (KC.l.131.5). Keel beam buttock line interface does not flow down
from the AIP but is required at FBJ to ensure straightness of the keel and radial (clocking)
position of the forward and aft bodies relative to the center section.
11see Appendix 6.
12 An assembly step that requires control over more attributes than what is physically possible is said to be over-
constrained. Over-constrained conditions arise because the location of a given feature on a rigid structure cannot be
independently changed without changing the location of other features on the same part. Only a perfect part in a
perfect assembly will have all features match exactly.
5. Uniformity of circumferential skin gaps (KC.1.131.7) around the outer perimeter of the
airplane at major body joints is a top level KC that flows down to FBJ and the back shops.
The measurement is part to part and is also required by QA. These data are discussed and
plotted in Chapter 5.
6. Horizontal skin lap alignment (KC.1.131.8) is a top level KC that flows down from the AIP
to back shop assembly. Forward and aft fuselage skin laps are measured relative to the center
section skin laps.
The internship case study problem (described in Section 3.2) examines KCs affected by excess
station length of section 44 body panels. That is, seat track and skin station gaps and
corresponding QA and HVC measurements. Because the build plan for section 44 washes
variation to the aft station, we are concerned primarily with the aft join.
3.1.1.1 Operational necessities and cultural implications
Mantripragada and Adams noted that the FBJ KCs are tightly coupled and cannot all be
independently controlled. This suggests that there is a physical explanation for why "best fitting"
occurs* operators are forced to decide between two alternatives that are mutually exclusive. This
is true throughout the manufacturing channel including the shops that build the body sections that
are joined in FBJ. In order to satisfy QA, backshops must wash variation into non-QA areas if
they wih to make rate. FBJ in turn must also satisfy both QA and production rate requirements
and therefore washes hardware variation into airplane straightness because this characteristic
does not generate QA rejection tags. The absence of reject tag activity is interpreted by the
backshop as a signal that there is no problem.
Operational personnel are forced to develop a standard for prioritizing mutually exclusive
requirements. The recurring theme throughout the factory is:
1. Satisfy QA requirements
2. Make production rate
3. Minimize non-MRB shimming
4. Satisfy internal customers and HVC requirements
The accepted norm, which is to wash variation into non-QA areas, seems to have evolved out of
operational necessity. People were asked to do something impossible and did their best to
deliver.
3.1.2 Section 44 build process and Key Characteristics
Section 44 is assembled in CC335 in one of two Floor Assembly Jigs (FAJ 144W0000) at the
Everett facility. There are two FAJs side by side. Odd numbered airplanes are assembled in FAJ
I and even numbered airplanes (including all of the 777-300s) in FAJ 2. The major components
and steps depicted in Figure 3.2 are:
1. Load the 11/45 section
2. Load and index the aft wheel well side of body (SOB) fittings (pickle forks)
3. Load and index the rear spar SOB fittings
4. Load and index the front spar SOB fittings
5. Load and index the left side panel
6. Load and index the right side panel
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Figure 3.2 Section 44 major components assembled in CC335
Datums and Key Characteristics for the section 44 assembly are shown in Figure 3.3. The 11/45
assembly is craned into position on six hydraulic jacks which are set to nominal. Level is
checked at three station locations at L/R BL 96 and WL 200 using a laser tracking system. Based
on discussions with shop mechanics the check is usually satisfactory and when it is not tooling or
target positioning can be corrected to achieve nominal leveling. Thus the locations of key
datums are determined by the accuracy of the vendor build process for section 11/45 and the
ability of the jacking system to place the section at nominal position within the FAJ coordinate
system. All other components are indexed to locations on the FAJ. Thus, in the as-designed
build process, part dimensions and FAJ features jointly determine the accuracy of the final
assembly.
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Seat track stations are set by the assembly vendor Fuji Heavy Industries (FHI). The vendor
indexes forward section seat tracks from the forward station and aft seat tracks from the aft
station so that variation is washed to the interface in the center of section 44 rather than to the
final body join datums D and E shown in Figure 3.3. This results in a critical interface in the
center of section 44 but less variation in seat track station gap at final body join. The original
build plan at CC335 called for the measurement of LBL 11 station deviation at STA 1035.25 and
1433.5 but this check has not been performed. Data from FHI for seat track station is up to date





Figure 3.3 Section 44 Datums and Key Characteristics
3.1.4 Vendor Key Characteristics for section 44 body panels
Of interest in the baseline case study is the location of the section 44 body panel aft skin edge
and the factors that affect it. Side panels are received from KHI at net trim and indexed in
CC335 at stringers 19L and 19R. Crown panels are indexed at stringer 12L and 12R to features
on the forward end gate of the CC335 FAJ. All panel length variation is therefore washed aft to













Right Side Skin Panel Assembly
Section 44 Crown Skin Panel Assembly















Figure 3.4 Section 44 body panel station index and measurement points.
Figure 3.4 shows the locations of section 44 body panel index and KC measurement points at
KHI and CC335. Unlike CC335 which builds airplanes in two FAJs, KHI assembles section 44
body panels in respective single FAJs. Measurements are not taken at the forward end (STA
1035.25) because this is the primary station index (section 4.3.1 discusses this fact in greater
detail which stems from the assumption that the existence of a hard index determines the exact
location of a part so that measurement is not necessary). The arrows on the left side of Figure 3.4
pointing to the skin edge at STA 1035 represent the stringer locations of hard index points at KHI
and CC335. KCs for aft skin edge station are measured at the stringer locations shown on the
right side of Figure 3.4. For example, at KHI the forward edge of the right side skin panel
assembly is indexed at stringer 20R and the aft skin edge station location is measured at stringers
28R, 24R, and 14R. CC335 indexes the same panel at stringer 19R and measures aft skin edge
station location at stringers 19R and 14R.
Figure 3.4 reveals that:
* Many index and measurement points for KHI and Boeing do not coincide.
* The aft skin edge station location is determined by the location of the forward skin edge and
the length of the panel. CC335 receives section 44 body panels at net trim and indexes them
to FAJ features that are set and checked by a different organization known as "tooling".
CC335 therefore has no control over the aft skin edge station location according to the design
build plan.
This design build process creates a dynamic that the author observed in several areas of the
factory: Operators believe that they have no control over the area that absorbs process
variation [aft skin edge]. If the feature [aft skin edge] is mis-located, there is nothing they
can do to correct it and, furthermore [they reason], it is not their fault. There is an HVC KC
check (Figure 3.4) but no QA requirement and HVC lacks teeth in that nothing happens if the
HVC measurement is out of tolerance or not performed at all. After a while, operators
conclude that there is no reason to check the feature. It is simply taken as given. When the
shop finds it necessary to deviate from the design build plan (see Section 3.1.5), they do not
make a corresponding adjustment to their apriori conclusion that it is unnecessary to check
the area where variation is absorbed [aft skin edge]. A problem arises if a downstream shop
has a critical interface in this area (such as the FBJ aft join) and the unplanned variation due
to shop "best fitting" adds to existing "planned" variation. One possible solution to this
dilemma is to flow QA requirements in a fashion similar to that of HVC. Alternatively, as is
being done in some areas through Process Engineering efforts, eliminate unnecessary HVC
measurements and educate shop personnel on the importance of the KC measurements that
are retained.
No measurements are taken at the forward skin edge. Therefore, compromise of the indexing
plan is quantifiable only as variation in aft skin edge station.
3.1.5 As designed versus as built body panel indexing
In practice CC335 mechanics "best fit" body panels contrary to the design indexing scheme (and
the directive build plan FAJ 144W0000 sheet 902 page 31-34) to avoid floor beam and frame
non-conformance reject activity. Instead of indexing side panels from the forward skin edge at
stringer 19L and 19R and crown panels at stringer 12L and 12R, mechanics slide the panels
forward and aft to minimize the station mismatch between side panels and center stub floor beam
attachment points and between crown and side panel frame ends. The center stub transverse
floor beams attach to seven locations in the lower aft area of the side panels although this is
difficult to see in Figure 3.2. Best fitting does not always cause a problem (nor is it avoidable
given the over-constrained nature of the design build plan [see Chapter 6 for the datum flow
chain analysis]). If it is necessary to "best fit", however, it should be done with a knowledge of
who might be affected downstream.
"Best fitting" can either alleviate or aggravate the effect of accumulated variation at the aft skin
edge and CC335 should therefore include appropriate process checks when they are forced to
knowingly violate the build plan. For example, if a crown panel is slightly longer than the
nominal engineering dimension (398.830 inches) the length variation has less impact on the aft
join if the panel is moved forward slightly during section 44 assembly. On the contrary if the
panel is moved aft this effect combines with the excess length to worsen the condition of the aft
join.
As in the case of final body discussed above, mechanics in CC335 have informally developed a
prioritization scheme that allows them to manage the requirements to build an over-constrained
assembly. The priority sequence established by the shop calls for:
1. Match floor beams so as to minimize shimming requirements (NCR required if station
mismatch is greater than 0.063).
2. Match crown to side panel frames so as to minimize shimming requirements (NCR required
if frame station mismatch is greater than 0.056).
3. Index forward skin edge of body panels to within +/- 0.030 of nominal.
The basis for the informal prioritization scheme is to first minimize QA reject tags which result
in production delays and rework. Variation in floor beam and frame station location is washed to
skin edges which in turn feeds into airplane alignment as discussed in Section 3.1.2. The
forward skin edge is checked to ensure it is not greater than 0.030 inches from the index point
and aft skin edge is taken as given. In Chapter 6 datum flow chain (DFC) methodology is used to
show that the design build plan for section 44 crown and side panels is not statistically capable of
matching frames to within 0.056 for station.
3.2 777 Hardware Variability Corrective Action: Baseline case study
This section describes a problem for which supervisory personnel in final body join were eager to
receive Process Engineering support. It became the basis for the internship case study because it
could be completed within six months and had significant cost, quality, and delivery
consequences.
3.2.1 Problem Description and Definition
The problem situation occurred in the aft join of FBJ where the forward end of section 46 is
joined to the aft end of section 44. Section 44 crown panels protruded aft beyond the side panel
assembly skin edge by 0.030 to 0.120 inches. This condition complicated the aft join due to:
* tight crown skin gap between 44 and 46 sections.
* non uniform circumferential skin gap around the aft join due to crown to side panel misfair1 3.
* wide seat track station gap due to crown skin reaching lower specification limit before seat
track gaps were in tolerance.
* short edge margin on the 46 section keel panel assembly.
" Misfair is the effect of variation on panel length and position. Two edges that are designed to be flush are slightly
displaced relative to one another. A diagram of this condition is shown in Figure 3.6.
Engineering requirements for section 44 panel assemblies call for skin station location to be
within 0.040 inches of nominal. Therefore the maximum amount of misfair between the crown
and the adjacent side panel that could result from properly indexed in tolerance skin panels is
0.080 inches. Final body join QA inspection records indicated that crown to side panel misfairs
as large as 0.120 inches had occurred and that on average the misfair was about 0.050 inches.
The result of this condition was that the aft join had a skin gap at the crown that was smaller than
the nominal value and a seat track gap wider than nominal.
This is represented on the diagram in Figure 3.5 which shows nominal (left) and as-is (right)
joins for the characteristics of concern final body join' 4. The dashed line represents STA 1434
about which the aft join is nominally centered. In the nominal join, which is shown on the left
side. the crown and side panels have a uniform skin gap of 0.170 inches with a tolerance of +/-
0.080 and the seat tracks have a gap of 2.00 +/- 0.060. In the keel area the section 46 keel panel
must fit over the section 44 strap so that a standard drill jig can be used to locate rivet holes prior
to fastening the two sections together. The rivet holes must be drilled at least one diameter away
from the edge of the section 46 keel skin and also one diameter away from the edge of the section
44 strap. If a hole is located such that if it is drilled there will be less than one hole diameter of
metal between the edge of the part and the hole, a condition known as a short edge margin will
result. A short edge margin is of serious concern because there is insufficient metal between the
fastener and the edge of the part to ensure sufficient structural strength is maintained. To prevent
a short edge margin the drill jig must be manually located. This results in production delays and
an increased risk of mislocated holes which must be filled and re-drilled causing further delays.
On the right side of Figure 3.5 is depicted the condition of a typical join. The gap between the
body panels is tighter than nominal and the section 44 body panels appear closer to the dashed
line that represents station 1434. Also, the crown panel is misfaired aft relative to the side
panels. At the same time the seat track gaps are wider than nominal and there is a frequent
occurrence of short edge margin at the keel.
14 I thank Process Engineer D. Watters for the descriptive picture. Contributions from he and co-worker C.
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Figure 3.5 Comparison between nominal and typical aft joins
There are many explanations of how such a condition could result because the fit between section
44 and section 46 depends on features of both sections. One hypothesis is that section 44 body
panels are longer than nominal. If this is true the skin gaps would be expected to close to the
lower tolerance limit before the seat tracks and keel edges reach their nominal positions. This is
exactly what is shown in the as-is join on the right side of Figure 3.5.
TRACK
3.2.1.1 Recent Events
Non conformance reject tags were written on airplanes in June of 1997 (UN 351) and September
1997 (L/N 377) both of which precipitated trimming rework in FBJ (see 3.2.2.1 for problem
chronology through June 1997). The activity in September of 1997 resulted in the loss of one
[M] day of production. Process engineers Schweigert and Watters prepared the visual
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Figure 3.6 Initial condition of aft join in September 1997 event
During the June 1997 rework it was noted that there was considerable risk of damage to the
crown ring which is flush beneath the aft skin edge of section 44 (see the STA 1434 crown
frames in Figure 3.2). Accordingly, in the September 1997 event the aft join was separated and
the section 46 forward skin edge was trimmed to remove the interference. This is illustrated in
Figure 3.7.
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Solution: Trim Section 46 crown panel skin edge.
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Figure 3.7 Rework to correct section 44 aft crown skin protrusion in September 1997
Following the September event in final body join there was significant management emphasis to
perform rework before body sections arrived at final body join. (FBJ is an historic bottleneck.
Lost output from FBJ is lost to the entire factory but the extent to which final body join was a
bottleneck had been significantly reduced in the past year due to improvements in the forward
join).
Preemptive rework on section 44 aft skin edges had already been performed on two airplanes in
July of 1997 in anticipation of potential interference problems in final body join because the
crown to side panel misfair was so pronounced that it could not be ignored by the build shop
(CC335). The rework, however, was unsatisfactory from the standpoint of final body join
because CC335 only trimmed the crown aft skin edge at the lap where the part to part fit between
the crown and side panel could be readily observed. This made it appear as though the crown
and side panels were flush. When these airplanes were joined, however, the crown protrusion
caused interference problems in areas away from the laps where no trimming was performed.
Sophisticated upstream rework was initiated by Schweigert and Watters on airplanes subsequent
to the September event. In these cases a clean station line was cut from the aft end of the section
44 crown if measurements indicated that an interference condition would occur in final body
join.
Airplane alignment was often adjusted in order to absorb the crown panel aft protrusion rather
than trimming. The tail of the airplane was deflected slightly downward to widen the skin gap at
the crown, close the seat track station gaps, and improve the edge margin at the keel.
Compromising airplane alignment to ameliorate a panel excess length problem may appear to be
questionable judgement yet it is rational from the perspective of the join crew:
* the assembly is over-constrained and it is not possible to have both a straight airplane and
gaps that are within QA tolerance limits because of the variation in the body structure
hardware features.
* there is considerable emphasis on maintaining the scheduled production rate.
* to correct the body structures so that the airplane can be nominally aligned and gain QA
approval for gaps would require rework and production delays.
* prevailing cultural folklore states that if features of the airplane (skin gap and seat track
station gap) are satisfactory to gain QA approval any impact on airplane alignment will be
insignificant with respect to drag penalty (this is discussed in Section 5.2.3).
* there is no QA requirement for airplane alignment.
* no higher level directive guidance is given as to which of the mutually exclusive alternatives
is most important.
Recall that the line move occurs on third shift. The operators are forced to use their judgement
and experience to decide what is most important. Features that require QA approval are
reasonably assumed to be critical as is production rate. It is a logical conclusion that alignment is
not as important. Moreover, small adjustments to gain QA approval are thought to be
insignificant. Laser alignment data for airplane straightness, the effect of adjusting airplane
alignment to control skin and seat track station gap, and aerodynamic studies are presented in
Section 5.2.3.
3.2.1.1 Problem History
The following chronology is not intended to be comprehensive but rather to demonstrate that the
join performance experienced during the internship period did not suddenly begin in June of
1997 but was the result of a bias rooted in the inception of the 777 program. Comments pertain
to the section 44 aft end (STA 1434) and were obtained from final body join QA records. There
were no comments regarding airplane alignment or panel misfair at the forward end of section 44
through June of 1997.
Comments
First 777 is joined
FBJ QA data is available
QA notes left side panel shifted forward relative to crown
QA notes crown panel misfaired aft 0.080 relative to sides
QA notes misfair between crown and side panel at stringer 14L
Non-conformance reject (NCR) activity for 44/46 keel short edge margin
short edge margin
QA notes difficulty satisfying skin and seat track station gaps
short edge margin
short edge margin
















































aft relative to sides and short edge margin
aft relative to sides and short edge margin
aft relative to sides and short edge margin
aft relative to sides and short edge margin
aft relative to sides
aft relative to sides and short edge margin
aft relative to side at 14L
aft relative to sides and short edge margin
aft at 14R and short edge margin
aft relative to sides and short edge margin
aft relative to sides and short edge margin,
section 44 crown trimmed in final body join.












4. Chapter 4 - Diagnosis of Problem Using in-place HVC and KC Data
This chapter presents a formal analysis of the subject problem using in-place measurement
systems. It shows that variation due to temperature changes in the factory may be a source of
significant variation and that measurement systems between KHI and Boeing are inconsistent.
4.1 Introduction
The salient indication noted by final body join QA personnel was that the section 44 crown panel
was often misfaired relative to the sides. The condition was confined to the aft end without a
corresponding misfair at the front. The analysis begins with a study of existing HVC data and
ends inconclusively because of discrepancies between the KHI and Boeing KC data sets. The
fact that in place measurement systems were inadequate to help pinpoint the source of the
problem is an important lesson resulting from the study.
4.2 Identification ofproblem
That the problem was identified so far downstream in the manufacturing process (i.e. in final
body join instead of in CC335 or KHI) is disturbing in light of the well developed datum
flowdown and measurement and indexing plans discussed in Chapter 3. It is also noteworthy
that the problem did not receive attention until almost four years of production had elapsed. This
may be because there were more important assembly issues competing for limited resource
attention. production rate effects that worsened the problem from one of being a nuisance to one
of intolerability, or other factors.
From an organizational dynamics standpoint, however, there may be incentives to knowingly
pass variation to customers who are likewise incited to wash the variation into different areas
(areas not checked by QA) and so on. Customers, on the other hand, have incentives not to
initiate formal feedback to the supplier which entrenches the status-quo until it is accepted
without question. This occurs because in order to initiate formal corrective action a non-
conformance reject tag (NCR) is required. When a shop writes an NCR, however, it often
experiences production delays 5 and incurs rework to correct the condition. If a small adjustment
can be made (such as shifting a panel forward or aft by 0.030 inches or slightly lowering the tail
of an airplane in final body join) to avoid the NCR process, shops often prefer to do so.
4.3 Formal Diagnosis using HVC data
The formal diagnosis is presented in the sequence that parts are manufactured and assembled
(during the internship the analysis proceeded from the point of problem identification in FBJ
upstream to the first supplier (CC335) and then to Boeing's supplier (KHI)). Data are presented
in chronological sequence but airplane line numbers have been disguised.
4.3.1 UMED 40
Technical guidance for the 777 HVC program is given in the Boeing document UMED 40 which
directs that KC data be measured at the locations shown in Figure 3.4. Concerning the station
position of section 44 body panels UMED 40 makes the following statements:
* "These key characteristics (i.e. the measurement points shown in Figure 3.4) are to be used to
maintain circumferential skin gaps at final body join. This is a customer requirement which
reflects manufacturing craftsmanship.
* Circumferential skin edges between major body sections must be parallel.
* Measurements are not made at the front of the section due to primary index points. Any
growth will occur in the aft direction.
* Station location of the circumferential skin edge must be maintained between the crown
panel assembly and the side panel assemblies. Any mismatch between these assemblies will
'5 Recall that anything requiring corrective action is reviewed by QA, Engineering, and Manufacturing in a formal
process This is considered necessary to ensure that the product is not compromised in any respect. The advantage
to this system is that it is a standard and documented process. The disadvantage is that it can take several days for a
shop to receive engineering disposition. Given the heavy emphasis on schedule adherence, many consider the MRB
process is onerous. In terms of suitability for statistical trend analysis from which root cause solutions can be
derived, the author found that the NCR system left much to be desired. Answers to simple questions such as "which
airplancs had a keel short edge margin" are almost impossible to find. Consequently, when a problem becomes
persistent or had enough to get attention, the data gathering process must often begin from scratch.
result in a trimming requirement at the aft end of the skin panels. Trimming is to be avoided
due to possible damage to the wheel well bulkhead upper frame doubler during the trimming
operation in CC335."
4.3.2 Variation due to temperature fluctuations
Boeing receives section 44 body panels from KHI in shipping mechanical equipment (SME)
fixtures. Each super-panel assembly (i.e. left, right, and crown) is securely packed in a dedicated
SME. SMEs for section 44 arrive in the Everett factory within 24 hours of the panels being
loaded in the FAJ although the lead-time varies considerably. This gives rise to the question of
thermal expansion and contraction as a potential source of variation.
It is implicitly assumed in the assembly plant that by the time panels are indexed they are in
thermal equilibrium with their surroundings and that factory ambient temperature is fairly
constant (the author observed that temperature averaged about 75 +/- 3 OF during the internship
and that within a given 24 hour period it remained within about a +/- 1 OF range). This is
generally a good assumption because of the time the panels spend on the floor and the two to four
shifts that elapse between the time when panels are loaded to when they are indexed. It is of
course possible that there are times when thermal equilibration has not occurred before indexing
and in these instances temperature effects could be a source of variation. This can be shown as
follows:
Data Equation
Thermal expansion coefficient of Al: CL = 1.2 x 10-5 in/in°F AL = cxL x Lx AT
Temperature change = 1 oF
Panel length = 398.830 in
AL = 1.2 x 10-5 in/in°F x 1F x 398.830in = 0.005 inches
For each Fahrenheit degree change in panel temperature the panel length is expected to change
by 0.005 inches resulting in a change of about 0.030 inches for the range of temperatures
observed in the factory during the internship. Boeing production engineers do not take
temperature effects into consideration when assessing sources of dimensional variation. The
simple calculation above indicates that this may be a mistake and that better thermal
compensation methods could represent an area of opportunity for process improvement.
4.3.3 Vendor KC Data
KHI manufactures section 44 body panel subassemblies at Gifu and performs super-panel
integration, skin trim, and measurement at Seaside (see Chapter 6). After trimming the aft skin
edge KHI measures KC data relative to the tool. Nominal offset is 0.250 inches which
corresponds to an engineering nominal length of 398.830 inches. Values greater than the
nominal offset of 0.250 indicate that the panel aft skin edge is farther away from the aft end gate
and hence the panel is shorter than engineering nominal. Likewise, if the measurement is less
than 0.250 the panel is longer than engineering nominal because the aft skin edge is closer to the
aft end gate than the nominal 0.250 measurement offset.
Measurements in Everett are relative to nominal at zero with negative measurements
corresponding to a panel length shorter than nominal (i.e. less than 398.830) by the measured
amount and positive measurements are longer than nominal. During the internship it was clear
that few Everett line engineers understood KHI's measurement system or how to interpret KHI's
data. It was not until about the fifth month of the internship that the author deciphered KHI's
reporting convention when KHI detailed how proposed trimming changes to section 44 panel
length would affect the KC.
KHI was chronically delinquent in submitting KC data. Efforts to obtain overdue data using
established channels in Everett proved time consuming and frustrating. For example, UN 364
was measured by KHI on 3/18/97, assembled by CC335 in June 1997, and joined and rolled out
in July 1997. From June to August 1997 attempts were made to obtain KHI KC data for
airplanes subsequent to UN 363. Finally on 9/2/97 data for UN 364 through UN 378 were
obtained from KHI via paper copy. At the time data through L/N 378 were rendered, however,
KHI had already cut and measured up to UN 393 and CC335 was building UN 380. Efforts to
obtain real time KC data were futile. In mid November data through UN 404, which had been
measured by KHI one month earlier, were received.
The author believes that KHI's delay in providing KC data is significant for reasons beyond mere
alacrity. Data trends show that KC.5.KHI.7 had no correlation with Everett measurements up to
UN 378 and then started to agree more closely afterward. This may indicate that KHI discovered
errors in their KC measurement process and corrected them but never revealed this fact to
Boeing.
KHI data in this section are converted to the standard used in Everett (zero equals nominal and
negative sign indicates panel is short). Appendix 5 shows a sample of raw KHI data as extracted
from the Everett database. The reporting format does not lend itself to ease of analysis. To
perform a meaningful analysis the data must first be sorted by measurement point ID (second
column in Appendix 5 which corresponds to stringer location). Data are then converted from
airplane effectivity number (i.e. WA001, WB076, etc.) to line number, and finally formatted into
a spreadsheet that can be plotted as a control chart. Then 0.250 is subtracted from each KHI KC
measurement to convert to the Everett standard. All data in this section were "treated" this way
except that line numbers are disguised.
4.3.3.1 Analysis of vendor part to tool KC data
Figure 4.1 shows a summary of treated vendor data for the ten KC measurement points given in
Appendix 5. Several conclusions are drawn:
* Ten points measured on over one hundred and thirty one airplanes are difficult to analyze on
a single plot.
* Only one point of 1310 is outside of engineering tolerance.
* The data do not explain how crown to side panel misfairs as large as those observed by final
body join could occur (FBJ observed up to 0.120 inch differences, see Section 3.2.1).
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Figure 4.1 Summary of KHI KC measurements on section 44 aft skin edge
The data can be separated into the component body panel measurements for the left side (Figure
4.2), crown (Figure 4.3) and right side (Figure 4.4). This makes it easier to identify trends but it
is difficult to perform interpretation that can be directly applied to final body join because FBJ
observes the part to part relationship at the aft skin edge at stringers 14L and 14R with crowns
misfaired aft relative to the sides. One can conclude, however, from the specification limits and
general appearance of the plots, that the vendor data seem to indicate that KHI is not the source
of the problems experienced by final body join. The following additional observations are made:
Left Side Panel
* No out of tolerance points.
* Centered around nominal.
* No aberrant trends present.
Crown Panel
* No out of tolerance points.
* Center of crown (lL and IR) appears slightly longer than laps (14L and 14R).
* Process shift toward longer panels begins around LIN 343 reflected at IL and IR.
* Process shift to longer measurement at 14L and 14R begins around LUN 378.
Right Side Panel
* A single point is out of tolerance.
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Figure 4.2 KHI KC measurements on section 44 left side panel aft skin edge
Figure 4.3 KHI KC measurements on section 44 crown panel aft skin edge
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Figure 4.4 KHI KC measurements on section 44 right side panel aft skin edge
Statistics based on the vendor KC data are shown in Table 4.1. Process capability calculations
show that KHI can meet engineering requirements most of the time, particularly in the case of a
centered and stable process such as the left side panel. Cp values less than unity in the case of
crown and right side panels are due to the trends noted above. Cp for the sample group of
airplanes taken either before or after the process shifts are greater than unity. This is shown in
Table 4.2.
KHI data for all 777s Manufactured through December 1997
Left Side Panel Crown Panel Right Side Panel
Stringer 28L 24L 14L 14L 1L 1R 14R 14R 24R 28R
Mean 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.014 0.010 0.002 -0.010 -0.007 0.005
Std Dev 0.008, 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.014
Cp 1.725 1.352 1.590 0.968 1.104 0.962 1.193 0.917 0.799 0.978
Cpk 1.522! 1.266 1.351 0.933 0.727 0.720 1.120 0.692 0.660 0.859












KHI data for 777s Manufactured from December 1996 through December 1997
Left Side Panel Crown Panel Right Side Panel
Stringer 28L 24L 14L 14L 1L 1R 14R 14R 24R 28R
Mean 0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.007 0.021 0.018 0.002 -0.020 -0.018 -0.001
Std Dev 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.011
Cp 2.066 1.180 1.451 1.107 1.253 1.053 1.243 1.512 1.216 1.210
Cpk 1.855 1.131 1.272 0.926 0.599 0.585 1.174 0.767 0.665 1.178
Table 4.2 Section 44 aft skin edge KHI KC data from July 1996 through December 1997
Data from the block of airplanes in Table 4.2 result in the following observations:
* Cp values show that KHI has good control over the magnitude of random variations.
* Cpk values less than the corresponding Cp's indicate off-center processes.
* Cpk values less than both Cp and less than unity indicate that the combination of random
variation and bias of the mean may represent a problem which can be improved by better
process centering. Nevertheless, the parts appear to be within tolerance since almost all of
the measurements fall within the upper and lower specification limits.
4.3.3.2 Analysis of vendor data based on part to part relationship
The part to part relationship between crown and side panels can be evaluated by subtracting the
side panel KC from that of the crown (both measured at stringer 14). A plot of such derived data
is shown in Figure 4.5. Given the common datuming and indexing scheme called out by UMED
40. the part to part relationship below should translate to the next build position and therefore be
representative of what the downstream customers observe. A comparison (between CC335 and
FBJ QA data) is performed in Section 4.4.
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Figure 4.5 Section 44 crown to side panel length mismatch based on KHI KC data
The upper and lower specification limits in Figure 4.5 are based on summation of the individual
panel tolerances (i.e. 0.040 + 0.040 = 0.080) although no explicit tolerance for lap misfair is
called out on an engineering drawing. It is clear from Figure 4.5 that the vendor data do not
explain the misfairs reported by FBJ. The following additional observations are made:
* A process shift to larger misfairs begins at around LUN 364, particularly for the right side
panel. This point corresponds to the break in data flow from KHI that was discussed in
Section 4.3.3.
* The largest mismatches in panel length occur between UN 385 and UN 395 but all of the
airplanes are within tolerance.
4.3.3.3 Preliminary conclusions based on vendor data
Analysis of vendor data shows good variability control indicated by high Cp values but more
attention should be paid to process centering and trend analysis. Data extraction and analysis is
difficult because of slow information flow and the spreadsheet manipulations required. In some
instances the points appear to lack randomness. This is indicated by long stretches of airplanes
with points on the same side of the mean, points trending in a direction, and the fact that only one
point is out of tolerance although the Cp's and Cpk's would predict more for the given number of
sample points.
If the vendor data are accurate, the problems in final body join are introduced elsewhere in the
process. To summarize the findings of the vendor data study:
* There differences between the convention used by KHI and Boeing to report KC data
* Confusion exists in Everett as to the meaning of KHI data
* KHI is chronically delinquent in providing KC data
* Format of data spread sheet is not conducive to statistical analysis because extensive sorting
and conversion from airplane effectivity to line numbers must be performed first.
4.3.4 CC335 KC data
UMED 40 calls for HVC data to be taken at the aft skin edge before and after panel integration in
order to monitor for elongation during assembly. The author compared before and after data
during the internship and found them to be largely uncorrelated and not a reliable indicator of
whether or not the panels were being elongated during fastening. There are several reasons why
this is so:
1. Panels are indexed and set on second shift and the "before" set of HVC data are taken. The
next day first shift inspects frame and floor beam alignment and if they can correct non-
conformance reject mismatch conditions with a slight (+/-0.030) panel station shift they do
so. This practice is referred to as "best fitting". Assembly procedures continue and prior to
the next line move the "after" set of HVC data are taken. Thus before and after data are often
taken with the panels deliberately shifted to different positions to accommodate the
conflicting incentives of mechanics on different shifts. The incentives are in conflict because
the assembly is over-constrained and each shift is responsible for satisfying a set of
requirements that is mutually exclusive from that of the other shift (i.e. the second shift in
CC335 indexes body panels to the features on the FAJ and first shift indexes to match floor
beams and frames, see Section 3.1.5)
2. Panels move forward and aft during assembly without direct operator action due to
mechanical vibration. The shims at the forward station (0.125 inches nominal) used to index
the panels are typically removed after the panels have been indexed so there is no hard stop at
either the forward or aft end.
3. Since the front end of the panel is not blocked during assembly elongation in the forward
direction could occur and would not be measured by HVC because data is only taken at the
aft end.
4. Measurement error is not considered. Based on feeler gage data obtained by the author
during the internship measurement probably accounts for +/- 0.010.
5. Thermal expansion and contraction are not accounted for (Section 4.3.2). In a given 24 hour
period the author observed maximum temperature changes in the factory of about 20 F which
would account for about 0.010 inches of change in panel length (assuming that the panel
temperature changed by the same amount as ambient air temperature).
Comparison of before and after HVC data give meaningless results because changes in the KC
values are due to many other factors besides panel elongation and it is not possible to know
which ones affected a given airplane. The "after" data set correlate with final body join QA
inspection records whereas the "before" set do not (Section 4.4). Consequently, of the two
conflicting data sets, post integration is more reliable and pre integration HVC data are not
considered in this thesis. During the internship the author suggested that CC335 be allowed to
discontinue the "before" HVC measurements but this was not done. At the end of the internship
the shop was still collecting the non-value added pre-integration data.
Section 5.1.5 presents a qualitative discussion of the effect of panel integration on length based
on the author's measurements during the internship. Most Boeing personnel believe that the
effect is very small and the author concurs.
CC335 HVC data are with respect to nominal at zero and negative numbers indicate that the
panel is short of nominal by that amount and versa visa for positive numbers. As was the case
with the KHI spreadsheets, Everett KC data require sorting, conversion from effectivity to line
number, and formatting in order to perform statistical analyses. The following sections present
the results of these efforts. Line numbers are disguised.
4.3.4.1 Analysis of CC335 part to tool KC data
Figure 4.6 shows a summary of CC335 data for the aft skin edge of section 44 body panels after
fastening. A mechanic collects the data in accordance with an O&IR job (operating and
inspection requirement) that specifies which KCs to measure. A mitotoyo depth gage is inserted
through features secured to the aft end gate and offset by 0.125 inches at the stringer locations
shown in Figure 3.4. The spread of the data is much larger than that of the vendor. The upper
and lower specification limits are set at +/- 0.030 (as opposed to +/- 0.040 for the vendor data)
and few points fall within tolerance. A marked positive bias is evident indicting that the panels
are either set too far back at the forward edge from which they are indexed or the panels are too
long (assuming that measurement error is only about +/- 0.010), or some combination of the two
effects. Per UMED 40 (Section 4.3.1) "measurements are not made at the front of the section
due to primary index points". Consequently, it is not possible to determine what causes the
offset by simply examining the data.
The following additional observations concerning the CC335 shop data are made:
* Many data points are missing.
* In order to include all the data the vertical axis must span a large range which makes detailed
analysis difficult.
* Many points on a given airplane are identical indicating that the data are suspect.
After L/N 364 the data are unreliable. From about UN 373 through 392 each point on a given
airplane is co-linear with the other measurements on the same airplane and there is a large
negative offset. If these data were accurate at least two significant effects would be directly
observable in production:
1. The aft skin edge of the crown and side panels would be flush.
2. The skin gaps in final body join would either be very wide (by about 0.250 for the airplanes
which are reported to measure -0.300 short of nominal) or the section 44 body panels would
touch the section 46 body panels (for the airplanes which are reported to measure 0.300 long
of nominal). In both instances considerable attention would be drawn because of the
magnitude of deviation from the already poor historical performance.
Since the data are in conflict with direct observations made during the internship, it is concluded
that data after L/N 364 are corrupt.
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Figure 4.6 Summary of CC335 HVC data for section 44 aft skin edge station
As before. the data are separated into left side (Figure 4.7), crown (Figure 4.8) and right side
(Figure 4.9) panels. To facilitate interpretation, vertical axes are set so that extreme points and
the corrupt data after L/N 364 are off scale.
One can conclude from the specification limits and general appearance of the plots that CC335
records more variability than does the vendor and that CC335 has tremendous difficulty meeting
specification limits. The following additional observations are made:
* There is a positive bias on all three body panels.
* The large variability may mask underlying cyclicality.
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Figure 4.7 CC335 HVC data for section 44 Left Side Panel aft skin edge station
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Figure 4.8 CC335 HVC data for section 44 Crown Panel aft skin edge stationN
Figure 4.8 CC335 HVC data for section 44 Crown Panel aft skin edge station
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Figure 4.9 CC335 HVC data for section 44 Right Side Panel aft skin edge station
Statistics based on CC335 data are shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Values for Cpk are
undefined because all of the process means are outside of the specification limits. Trends in the
vendor data are either masked by noise or absent. Comparison of Table 4.3 with Table 4.4 shows
an insignificant difference between data sample sets (i.e. the process is consistently out of control
since the start of the program).
CC335 KC data for all 777s Manufactured through June 1997
Left Side Panel Crown Panel Right Side Panel
Stringer 19L 14L 14L 1L 14R 14R 19R
Mean 0.076, 0.044 0.0661 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.077
Std Dev 0.050 0.124 0.122 0.048 0.158 0.193 0.051
Cp 0.202 0.081 0.082 0.207 0.063 0.052 0.195
Cpk Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined
Table 4.3 Section 44 aft skin edge statistics based on CC335 KC data for all 777s
manufactured through June 1997
CC335 KC data for 777s Manufactured June 1996 throuah June 1997
Left Side Panel Crown Panel Right Side Panel
Stringer 19L 14L 14L 1L 14R 14R 19R
Mean 0.073 0.066 0.086 0.047 0.070 0.052 0.068
Std Dev 0.040 0.118 0.126 0.041 0.141 0.135 0.044
Cp 0.248 0.085 0.079 0.243 0.071 0.074 0.229
Cpk Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined
Table 4.4 Section 44 aft skin edge statistics based on CC335 KC data for 43 777s
manufactured from June 1996 through June 1997
Data from the block of airplanes in Table 4.4 result in the following observations:
* The process mean is outside the upper specification limit (0.030) in every case.
* Cp values significantly less than unity indicate that random variation is also a problem.
4.3.4.2 Analysis of CC335 data based on part to part relationship
The part to part relationship between crown and side panels can be analyzed by subtracting the
side panel KC from that of the crown (both measured at stringer 14) as was done in Section
4.3.3.2. This is shown in Figure 4.10. Note that these data represent the condition of the section
after fastening and therefore should be representative of what final body join observes.
Disagreement between KHI and CC335 part to part data can be explained on the basis of
measurement errors, suspect data, violation of indexing schemes, or some combination. After
panel integration in CC335, however, relative movement between crown and sides is infeasible
and conflicts between data sets in CC335 and final body join must be due to either measurement
error or suspect data.
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Figure 4.10 Section 44 crown to side panel length mismatch based on CC335 KC data
The upper and lower specification limits in Figure 4.10 are based on summation of CC335 build
plan tolerances (i.e. 0.030 + 0.030 = 0.060) although no explicit tolerance for lap misfair is given
on an engineering drawing. As much as CC335 has trouble meeting specification limits for
individual panel positioning, they have difficulty with the part to part relationship. This is
particularly problematic because the part to part fit is on the outer skin and readily observable to
internal and external customers. CC335 data shows a trend after about UN 343 toward larger
misfairs which coincides with a vendor shift in the crown and right side panels (Section 4.3.3.1).
Unfortunately, because CC335 data after L/N 364 are corrupt, further comparisons are not
possible. The following additional observations are made:
* Points equal to zero are questionable because this implies that the crown and side panels are
perfectly flush. A more likely explanation is that a single data point was inputted repeatedly.
* The largest mismatches in panel length occur after LIN 350. This coincides with the start of
the internship and helps explain why Final Body Join was eager to have the issue looked into:
it was an immediate problem that had apparently been worsening over time. It may also
explain why the problem was "tolerated" for four years. Only when it got bad enough to
threaten the delivery schedule did it receive attention. The theme seemed to recur throughout




4.3.4.3 Preliminary conclusions based on CC335 data
In a properly designed and functioning hardware variability control (HVC) system the KC data
should lead one to the source of the problem. In this case one would conclude that:
* When KHI measures the body panels they are in tolerance.
* When CC335 measures the aft skin edge of completed body sections the panels are too far
aft.
* CC335 data match the problem described by final body join.
* The information necessary to identify the problem was available to CC335 for four years but
no one reacted to it until it threatened production (the factory was ramping up production at
around L/N 350 from an airplane every four days to one every three days).
* Since the parts are in tolerance at KHI and out of tolerance after leaving CC335 the panels
must either be elongating during shipment and/or assembly or CC335 is mis-indexing them
too far aft. Elongation of panels during integration in CC335 is discussed in Section 5.1.5.
4.4 Comparison between KHI and CC335 data
In this section a comparison between the KHI and CC335 data is made to check for internal
consistency. KHI and CC335 data should differ by only the random variation inherent within the
respective measurement processes (taking for granted Boeing's assumption that temperature
effects are negligible). That this is not the case is shown in Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12. To
repeat a now familiar theme, the differences could be due to measurement error or violation of
indexing plans, or a combination of the two.
Final Body Join began recording the misfair at whichever side was worst on L/N 350. These data
are recorded manually during third shift when the body sections are joined. Note that the
correlation between KHI and CC335 is poor but that the correlation between CC335 and FBJ is
fairly good.
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Figure 4.11 Left side/crown misfair based on KHI, CC335, and FBJ QA data
Figure 4.12 Right side/crown misfair based on KHI, CC335, and FBJ QA data
Another test of fit between KHI and CC335 includes a scatter plot of one versus the other.
Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 show CC335 left and right crown/side misfair, respectively, versus
the corresponding KHI values (values obtained from Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.10). There is much
more spread along the CC335 axis (x) than along KHI's (y) and the data do not associate in a
rw
linear fashion as would be expected. For comparison Figure 4.15 shows CC335 data versus FBJ
QA data from L/N 350 through UN 364. The correlation is good.
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Figure 4.13 Scatter plot of CC335 vs KHI left side/crown misfair
The value r2 shown in Figures 4.13 through 4.15 is the correlation coefficient squared which
approximates the fraction of the total variation in the data that is accounted for by a relationship
between the plotted variables. The square root of this value (i.e. r) can be used to evaluate the
significance of the relationship between the variables. In Figures 4.13 and 4.14 there are 92 data
pairs resulting in v = 92-2 = 90 degrees of freedom. In this case an r value of 0.1726 is needed to
give 90% confidence of a correlation between KHI and CC335 data. Referring to Figure 4.13
(which has a higher correlation than Figure 4.14), since (0.0046)1/2 is only 0.068 which is less
than 0.1726 we conclude that the data do not correlate. In Figure 4.15, on the other hand, 11
points are plotted with 9 degrees of freedom. r = (0.8812)1/2 = 0.939 which is much greater than
the 0.7348 needed for 99% confidence that there is a correlation.
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Figure 4.14 Scatter plot of CC335 vs KHI right side/crown misfair
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Figure 4.15 Scatter plot of CC335 vs FBJ QA side/crown misfair
Figure 4.15 Scatter plot of CC335 vs FBJ QA side/crown misfair
4.5 Summary of Chapter
KHI and Boeing HVC data are inconsistent. KHI data seem to indicate that there is not a
problem at the vendor level and that the section 44 aft skin edge station trimming process is
centered and capable. The KHI data are almost "too good" because for the calculated values of
Cp and Cpk one would expect more than one point out of 1,310 to be outside of the tolerance
limits. CC335 data, on the other hand, indicate that the process is off-center and incapable of
meeting tolerances. The CC335 data match the observations made by final body join over a
relatively short span of airplanes.
At face value these results lead one to believe that CC335 introduces the variation by violating
the index plan. Confounding the matter, however, is the fact that KHI and CC335 part-to-part
data do not correlate as they should because of the common indexing scheme. This inconsistency
makes it difficult to determine the real source of the problem because both data sets cannot be
correct. Not even temperature effects would cause the crown panel to grow relative to the side
panels. When the panels are placed side by side during assembly in Everett the crown panels are
visibly longer than the side panels although the KHI KC data suggest that they should be of equal
length.
Temperature may be a source of variation in overall panel length that is not adequately accounted
for in Boeing's manufacturing processes.
Measurement error is not quantified in any of the formal HVC KC processes examined. The
author estimates that it is approximately +/-0.010 for the data presented in this chapter.
Panel elongation during integration in CC335 may explain the conflict between KHI and CC335
data sets, however, this will be ruled out later in Section 5.1.5.
The problem existed for a long time before receiving attention. This may be due to more
pressing issues competing for the attention of limited resources. It may also be because the
heavy emphasis on schedule adherence forces shops to work around problems as much as
possible in order to make rate. Because of this, efforts are directed toward creating symptomatic
solutions to problems as though they were isolated events. This weakens the ability of the
organization to reach solutions at a fundamental level thereby fostering an even greater
dependence on reactive problem solving.
5. Chapter 5 - Diagnosis of problem using local measurements
The KC data in Chapter 4 indicate that CC335 introduces out of tolerance variation by
compromising the indexing of section 44 body panels. UMED 40 (Section 4.3.1) specifies that
excess skin at the aft end must be trimmed in CC335. Such a requirement would give CC335
incentive to properly index the panels (so that they wouldn't have the work of trimming) and also
to aggressively communicate problems back to the vendor. Unfortunately for final body join the
UMED 40 guidance to measure and trim the section 44 aft skin edge is not reflected on the
engineering drawings that dictate the build process.
The build plan, an engineering drawing that is different from UMED 40, assumes that panels
arrive at net trim and are indexed from the forward edge so that CC335 has no control over the
aft skin edge station. Therefore, even though length variation is washed to the aft skin edge,
CC335 is not required to measure the station location, much less trim it to nominal. HVC
measurements are called out, but these are not utilized in the shop. HVC data, when taken, are
uploaded to a central database and mechanics in the shop rarely received feedback. HVC jobs
are perceived as little more than a non-value added nuisance that interfere with the task of
building airplanes. Given this state of affairs, it is remarkable that CC335 HVC data correlate
with final body join QA records at all (see Figure 4.15). Recall from Section 4.3.3.1 that the
shop data became corrupt at about L/N 364 at which point the correlation between CC335 and
final body join QA data sets ended.
Based on the "official KC data", a possible solution would be to incorporate the UMED 40 skin
edge measurement and trimming requirements into the directive engineering drawing. CC335
would be forced to correct the problem that the KC data indicate is caused by their practice of
"best fitting". The problem with this approach, however, is that the aft end crown to side panel
misfair is not accompanied by a corresponding misfair at the forward end. This means that the
crown panels are longer than the sides and that CC335 would be required to correct a condition
that they are not fully responsible for causing (although forcing them to do so would provide
incentive for them to communicate the condition to their supplier instead of passing it to their
customer).
5.1 Informal measurements
In this section the author examines various independent measurement and data sources that are
not part of the formal HVC program. Efforts were made to repeat measurements on fixed
hardware features in order to estimate the magnitude of measurement error. Conflicts between
information sources were sought to reduce the risk of confirmation bias (wherein a researcher
recognizes only data that confirm his or her hypothesis and ignores conflicting data). The author
concedes that this goal was not completely realized and section 5.1.3.1 describes an instance
where a statistically significant signal should have been recognized but was left unresolved until
after the internship ended.
5.1.1 Difference in length between crown and side panels
A first step in the investigation involved checking the part to part length relationship between the
crown and side panels. If the panels were the same length at stringers 14L and 14R as the KHI
data indicated. misfair at the aft station must also be observable at the forward station. An easy
way to spot check whether or not KHI's data are believable is to measure the amount by which
the crown panel protrudes aft from the side panels at station 1434 and comparing this to the
condition at the forward end (station 1035).
At the start of the informal investigation UN 364 was in FBJ and KHI had supplied Boeing with
aft skin edge KC data up to UN 363. Three airplanes earlier (the June 1997 rework incident
described in Section 3.2.1) the aft skin edge of the section 44 crown was trimmed in FBJ due to
excess length which caused insufficient gap between the section 44 and section 46 crown panels.
In fact, of the previous sixteen airplanes, fourteen had a condition where the crown panel
protruded aft of the side panels with the average protrusion being 0.06 inches and no
corresponding offset at the forward end. KHI data for all of these airplanes, however, indicated
that the panels were of equal length within 0.010 inches. A work procedure known as
"greenline 6 ' was initiated by final body join requesting that a check be performed on the
airplanes between FBJ and CC335 and that any misfairs greater than 0.030 be trimmed prior to
arrival in CC131. The greenline was dispositioned such that FBJ would be required to perform
the rework.
Instead of receiving support to prevent the problem from reaching final body join, final body join
was given the added work of correcting the condition when and if it occurred again. FBJ thus
had a strong incentive to best fit around the problem in order to make rate. They cancelled the
green line which they had hoped would precipitate a root cause analysis and dropped the tail of
subsequent airplanes that had the problem condition (see Section 5.2.3 for laser alignment data).
The resulting lack of further reject tag activity back to the section 44 build shop supported
CC335's contention that there was no problem. Each entity in the supply chain thus has the
incentive to best fit around the problem and pass it to their customer.
With a feeler gage that had a smallest division of 0.005 the author checked for misfair at stringers
14L and 14R at the section 44 forward and aft end crown to side laps. These measurement data
were used to prepare the overhead view as shown in Figure 5.1. L/UN 373 and 374 are shown as
they were measured during the assembly process. The numbers in the diagrams are in
thousandths of inches and are the averages from all of the post-fastening measurements taken
(steel tape data is also shown on the figure and is discussed in Section 5.1.2). Negative numbers
indicate the crown skin edge is aft relative to the adjacent side panel.
1" Appendix 6 contains a glossary of Boeing specific terms, acronyms, and definitions that are used throughout the
thesis.
[ Right Side Panel I
Crown long of nominal by 72 +/-30 (n=4) at str 14R by end to end tape.
6 Crown longer than side by 52 +/-10 (n=7) at str 14R by feeler gage. -46
Forward Line Number 373 Aft
Crown Panel
-31 Crown long of nominal by 57 +/-30 (n=2) at str 14L by end to end tape. -96
Crown longer than side by 65 +/-10 (n=7) at str 14L by feeler gage.
Left Side Panel
Right Side Panel
Crown long of nominal by 60 +/-30 (n=4) at str 14R by end to end tape.
-28 Crown longer than side by 68 +/-10 (n=7) at str 14R by feeler gage. -96
Forward Line Number 374 Aft
Crown Panel
20 Crown long of nominal by 68 +/-30 (n=2) at str 14L by end to end tape. -41
Crown longer than side by 61 +/-10 (n=7) at str 14L by feeler gage.
Left Side Panel
Figure 5.1 Overhead view of misfair and steel tape measurements on two airplanes
The difference of the aft measurement from the forward measurement is the length mismatch
between the crown and adjacent side at stringer 14. For example, Figure 5.1 shows that on L/N
373 the crown is 6-(-46) = 52 thousands of an inch longer than the side at 14R and -31-(-96) = 65
thousandths longer than the side at 14L. Measurements from UN 364 through L/N 403 are
plotted in Figure 5.2.
Misfair at the forward end of section 44 is not sufficient to explain the aft misfair. In general
CC335 maintains the forward end misfairs to less than 0.030 inches and after the final body join
incident that occurred in September of 1997 paid particular attention to indexing. CC335
indexing contributes, but is not the sole cause of the problem. Also, in CC335's defense, the
index points for the crown panels are at stringer 12L and 12R and at 19L and 19R for the sides.
Thus, misfair at 14L and 14R could be explained even with perfect indexing if the skin edges
were not straight but instead had a slight curve. This situation was observed several times during
the course of the investigation where crown and sides were indexed exactly at nominal and
misfairs on the order of 0.020 were observed at the laps.
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Figure 5.2 Section 44 Crown Panel length in excess of Side Panel at stringer 14L and 14R
Seven sets of measurements were taken on the first fifteen airplanes in Figure 5.2 in order to
estimate measurement error. Each measurement was the average of two individual
measurements taken at the same time. The airplanes were followed through the assembly
process (some movement was noted on measurements from before and after fastening but the
excess length did not change due to riveting) and standard deviations on the order of 5
thousandths were calculated. Thus the feeler gage (FG) data are considered accurate to +/- 0.010
inches. Figure 5.2 also shows KHI KC and final body join QA data. The feeler gage
measurements track closely with the QA data but not with that of KHI. Note, however, that after
about L/N 388 KHI data at 14R begins to match the part to part feeler gage measurement (the
two blue lines in Figure 5.2 converge) but that 14L agreement is still poor (the two green lines do
not converge).
The author contends that KHI began troubleshooting their KC measurement process around L/N
364 when they learned of the problem in Everett. They then delayed reporting of KC data for
several months (recall that there was correlation between CC335 KC data and FBJ QA up to L/N
363 but no correlation with KHI). After L/N 363 CC335 data are corrupt. This precludes
correlation between CC335 and KHI data but local measurements with feeler gage provide some
measure of crossover. KHI data did not track with Everett data at all until UN 363; began to
track slightly after UN 364; and then tracked closely after L/N 388.
The correlation coefficients between Everett and KHI data are summarized in Table 5.1. The
unexplained shift from no correlation between Everett and KHI to statistically significant
correlation after L/N 116 leads the author to believe that KHI identified and corrected problems
with their KC measurement on crown and/or side panels sometime around UN 389 but did not
notifiy Everett of the change.
Sample Group Correlation Coefficient Significance
CC335 vs. KHI @14L, up to L/N 363 0.067 None
CC335 vs. KHI @14R, up to L/N 363 0.056 None
CC335 vs. FBJ QA 0.939 >99%
Feeler gage vs. KHI @14L, L/N 364-388 0.048 None
Feeler gage vs. KHI @14R, L/N 364-388 0.085 None
Feeler gage vs. KHI @14L, L/N 389-406 0.284 <90%
Feeler gage vs. KHI @14R, L/N 389-406 0.807 >99%
Table 5.1 Correlation between various data sets for section 44 aft skin edge misfair
5.1.2 Steel tape measurements
Forward to aft end measurements of section 44 crown panels at stringers 14R and 14L were made
with a calibrated steel tape. The tape had a smallest division of 1/8 inch (0.125) and the nominal
panel length per drawing is 398.830. Measurements were performed by the author and a process
engineer. The measurement results are given in Table 5.2. Each number represents the average
of four measurements with a standard deviation of about 15 thousandths inches. This suggests an
accuracy of 30 to 45 thousandths which is constant with the following thumb rule: accuracy is
about one third of the smallest division (40 thousandths in this case). Steel tape data in Table 5.2
indicate that the crowns are between 45 and 125 thousandths long of nominal.













Table 5.2 Crown panel length in excess of nominal based on steel tape measure at Everett
In response to pressure and data from Everett, KHI measured panels in Japan with a steel tape.
Initially they measured only L/N 393 and reported crown lengths of 398.940 inches and 398.880
at stringers 14L and 14R respectively. Interestingly, KHI cited a nominal of 398.915 which is
0.085 greater than engineering. The KHI representative, under the impression that the nominal
value was in fact 398.915. demonstrated pride in the fact that the crown was within tolerance (+/-
40) at 25 thousandths over at 14L and 35 thousandths under at 14R. It was brought to his
attention that the correct nominal value was 398.830 and it was requested that KHI confirm the
value to which they had been trimming panel length.
Steel tape measurement data from KHI






Table 5.3 Crown panel length in excess of nominal based on steel tape measure at KHI
Steel tape measurement data in CC335
KHI did not directly respond to this request but in subsequent communications listed the correct
nominal value of 398.830. KHI reported the steel tape measurements shown in Figure 5.3 along
with temperature data. They made the argument that thermal expansion and contraction would
bring the panels to nominal when they equilibrated in Everett. KHI did not explain the system of
temperature compensation in use although they were requested to do so. KHI also did not
explain how they could seasonally adjust their trimming process for changing differences
between KHI and Everett (i.e. KHI is warmer than Everett in the summer but colder in the winter
so if KHI trims long in the summer they must also trim short in the winter. Upon further
questioning KHI stated that the assembly FAJ was constructed of aluminum so that thermal
expansion and contraction effects cancelled. Under hot conditions, it was explained, the FAJ
expands with the panel and by resulting in a longer trim at the higher temperature so that when
the panel contracts it will be at the nominal length. The opposite occurs in the cold. KHI did not
state at which temperature the nominal length would occur. The author recommends that Boeing
establish one.
The calculation for thermal contraction given the KHI data on L/N 392 is as follows:
Data Equation
Thermal expansion coefficient of Al: oXL = 1.2 x 10.5 in/in0 F AL = at x L x AT
Temperature difference = 100F
Panel length = 398.830 in
AL = 1.2 x 10-5 in/in°F x 100 F x 398.830 in = 0.048 inches
KHI's argument is plausible. At 750 F all of the values in Table 5.3 should be about 0.050 less
and therefore all except one will be within tolerance. When UIN 392 was measured in Everett,
however, it was long. This leads to the following concerns with KHI's temperature argument:
* The steel tape has a thermal expansion coefficient about half (6 x 10-6 inlinoF) that of Al.
Correcting for this effect would lead to a length contraction of only 25 thousandths from 850 F
to 75F vice the 50 thousandths predicted by KHI.
Were the panels thermally equilibrated at 850F when the measurements were taken? The
smaller steel tape (with a much higher surface area to volume ratio than the body panel)
would be expected to have a much higher thermal diffusivity and be more effected by
fluctuations in temperature unless both tape and panels were maintained at the same
temperature for some soak period. In all likelihood, if the daytime temperature was 850 F and
the average temperature over the last several days was lower than this value, then the small
tape would be warmer than the panel. Then the expected thermal contraction would be less
than 25 thousandths when measured by steel tape at 75 0 F.
5.1.3 Floor assembly jig measurement features
An independent set of measurement data were obtained based on features of the FAJ.
Measurement indexes located forward and aft at stringers 1, 12, and 19 (left and right) on each of
the FAJs with nominal offset values of 0.125 were measured with a feeler gage having a smallest
division of 0.005 inches. These measurements resulted in the exaggerated overhead views shown
in Figure 5.3. The numbers on either end denote the measured offset in inches based on the
average of between two and four individual measurements taken at the same time (std deviation
= +/- 0.003). Measurement error is estimated to be approximately +/- 0.006 at either end of the
FAJ or about +/-0.012 inches for overall panel length by this method. Measurements were taken
over a period of several days before and after panel integration to evaluate elongation. The
numbers at the crown to side lap indicate the misfair measurement discussed in earlier in Section
5.1.1 and are the same as those shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.3 shows that on L/N 380 the right side panel was nominally indexed at 0.125 inches
from the tool feature at the forward end of stringer 19R and that it did not move or elongate
during fastening. The corresponding aft skin edge is 40 thousandths aft of nominal indicating
that the panel is long of nominal by 0.040 at stringer 19. The crown panel appears mispositioned
aft on the left side and slightly forward on the right and extends aft by over 0.100. The left side
panel is positioned 0.025 forward of nominal and aft it extends about 0.030 aft of nominal
indicating excess length of about 0.055. As mentioned earlier, CC335 interpreted the build plan
to allow +/-0.030 of play on the forward index. Based on Figure 5.3 UN 380 is not even in
accordance with this "best fitting" criterion. UN 381 is indexed within 0.005 inches of nominal
before fastening but post integration measurements show that the left side panel shifted forward
about 0.020 inches (perhaps before riveting to match floor beams or frames and avoid NCR
activity or the panel may have shifted during fastening due to vibration).
The data shown in Figure 5.3 were collected beginning with UN 377 and continued after the
internship ended. These data are plotted in Figure 5.4 for stringers 19L, IL, and 19R. KHI
argued that the data were suspect due to the possibility of mispositioned measurement features.
A tooling request was submitted in August of 1997 to check the positions of the primary station
locators and the HVC measurement points. In October a report from tooling revealed that all
features on FAJ 1 were within tolerance (+/-0.012) based on laser tracking coordinates. FAJ 2
had still not been verified at the time the internship ended in December.
It should be noted that Figure 5.4 shows overall excess panel length from the forward to the aft
end. Final body join is most concerned with aft end panel protrusion beyond nominal. Table 5.4
shows that panel station deviation in the aft direction is slightly less than the total excess length
implying a small forward bias in indexing. This point is subtle but important because if the panel
lengths are corrected to nominal overall but the build process causes a shift forward, the aft end
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Figure 5.4 Section 44 body panel excess length based on CC335 FAJ features
The data in Figure 5.4 show an odd/even association pattern that may indicate a bimodal
distribution. Table 5.4 shows that the measurements seem to differ between FAJ 1 and FAJ 2
and that the standard deviations are smaller when FAJ to FAJ variability is removed by breaking
the data into odd and even groups. It is worthwhile to ask whether or not the differences are
statistically significant because KHI trims section 44 body panels in one FAJ (see Chapter 6 for a
datum flow chain analysis of the assembly process). This means that if there is an odd/even
pattern. it is probably due to measurement differences between the two FAJs in CC335.
Breakdown of FAJ measurement data for L/N 379 through L/N 404 (inches from nominal)
Stringer Stringer Stringer
19L IL 19R
Total excess length for all airplanes in both FAJs 46 89 38
Standard Deviation 16 26 22
FAJ 1 only (odd line numbers 379-403) 55 104 26
Standard Deviation 14 22 10
FAJ 2 only (even line numbers 380-404) 37 70 54
Standard Deviation 11 22 24
Aft station protrusion beyond nominal 33 84 33
Standard Deviation 12 19 24
Table 5.4 FAJ measurement data
5.1.3.1 Significance tests for differences in CC335 data between FAJ 1 and FAJ 2
The author assumes that panels measured in FAJ 1 and FAJ 2 in CC335 are drawn from the same
normally distributed population and therefore have the same means and standard deviations.
This is reasonable since KHI produces odd and even numbered airplane panels on common lines.
A test of the hypothesis that there is a difference in measurement between FAJI and FAJ2 is
desired. Accordingly the test statistic is:
t(vJ+, 2 ) = [(X - X 2 ) - (L1 - .2)]/S(XI - X2)
Based on the assumption of a single population of panels, L - .2 is zero. The symbol v equals
the degrees of freedom which is the sample size less one for each sample group. The pooled
variance is:
sp2 (Vi 2 + V 2
2 S2
2 )(VI + V 2 )
so that t,,].,,2) is given by:
t(v+v,2) = (X1 - X2 )/[Sp(l/n, + /n 2) 1/2]
For the left side panel and data in Table 5.4: sp = 12.58 and t(v+v 2 ) = 3.64. Level of significance
for a two tail test at 95% confidence from the t distribution is t24,0.0 5 = 2.06. Thus, since t(vl+v 2 ) is
greater than the critical value we conclude that the measurement systems are different. The
maximum listed confidence for a two tail test is 99.5% with a critical value of 3.09. Since the
test statistic for the left side panels is greater than this it is fairly certain that the difference
between the two set of measurements is not the result of stable random variation effects. A
reasonable conclusion is that the measurement systems differ due to offsets in the tooling
features.
For the crown panels t(,,l+, 2 ) = 3.94 and the measurement systems differ. Finally, for the right side
panels t,, I ,, = 3.88 and again the panel measurement systems differ.
The significant difference in measurement data sets is an important clue that something is wrong.
The author did not recognize this during the internship, in part because the odd-even pattern took
time to develop amidst other process noise. Several months later, Boeing Process Engineers
discovered that measurement features on both FAJs were mispositioned (see Section 7.2).
5.1.5 Growth of body panels during assembly operations
Whether or not the excess length may be due to panel growth during drilling and riveting
operations in CC335 is a reasonable question. Data of the type shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure
5.4 were collected before and after panel integration on each airplane in the study (about forty
airplanes for lap misfair as in Figure 5.1 and thirty airplanes in the CC335 FAJs as in Figure 5.2).
Steel tape data were also obtained before and after assembly on the airplanes listed in Table 5.2.
A statistical comparison of the before and after data was not performed but the following
qualitative statements are made:
Forward and aft sliding of the panels relative to one another was often observed between pre
and post integration. The reasons for this were discussed in Section 4.3.4.
* The relative part-to-part mismatch between crown panel and side panels (data of the sort
shown in Figure 5.2) did not change by a noticeable amount. Recall that the measurement
error for this check was estimated in Section 5.1.1 as +/- 0.010 inches.
* Steel tape measurements showed no change. The measurement error for this check was
estimated in Section 5.1.2 as +/- 0.040 inches.
* Overall panel length (data of the sort shown in Figure 5.4) did not change appreciably. The
reader may confirm this by examining Figure 5.3 which is typical of the thirty airplanes
measured. Sometimes panels appeared to elongate slightly and other times they appeared to
contract. Changes were typically around 0.005 inches and directionally inconsistent. Recall
that the measurement error for this check was estimated in Seection 5.1.3 as +/- 0.012 inches.
The author believes that a detailed statistical study of the effect of integration is worth
performing only for the sake of completeness. It is further opined that integration effects on
panel length are much smaller than measurement error and length changes due to the relatively
minor fluctuations in factory air temperature.
5.2 Analysis of Final Body Join Data
This section describes three data sources available in final body join used to further diagnose the
problem. These are QA data, HVC data, and laser alignment system data.
5.2.1 Final Body Join QA data
On each airplane CC 131 QA inspectors record key features for the forward and aft joins. These
data include:
* WL 200 based on laser targets
* Seat track LBL 11 BL based on laser targets
* Seat track station gaps
* Outside skin surface skin to bulkhead gaps
* Keel beam BL
* Skin station gaps
The QA measurements are similar to the KCs recorded by the HVC system per UMED 40 that
were discussed in Section 3.1.1 except that:
* QA checks are performed by trained QA inspectors whereas HVC jobs are performed by
mechanics for whom the demands of maintaining production rate compete for attention.
* QA is directive in nature and drives NCR and MRB activity whereas "nonconforming" HVC
measurements may go unchecked for long periods of time (see, for example, Figure 4.6).
* There are some technical differences in the exact location and types of measurements taken
between QA and HVC in FBJ. For instance, HVC does not measure seat track station gap
but takes skin station gaps at many more locations than does QA.
* QA requirements determine the final positioning of the body sections because failure to meet
QA tolerances results in non-conformance reject activity which must be corrected. On the
contrary, failure to meet HVC requirements often does not carry any immediate
consequences. In spite of the laser alignment system, final body join mechanics and
supervisors maintain that most joins are set to align features of the airplane (skin and seat
track gaps) in order to obtain QA approval. Typically, body sections are brought together
using laser alignment, adjusted as necessary to obtain QA approval, and final laser alignment
data are recorded and accepted as given.
* QA requirements are pragmatic in that they inspect features that are observable to customers
or necessary to ensure aircraft integrity or safety. HVC measurements, on the other hand,
often measure abstract things such as distances to points in space that are not directly related
to airplane parts. The selection of LBL 11 and WL 200 as primary BL and WL datums in the
777 program helps to address this issue
The point of the distinction between QA and HVC is that QA represents a data source with
significant credibility and authority that HVC unfortunately lacks. For the purposes of this
analysis, QA seat track and skin station gap are relevant. Figure 5.5 shows skin station and seat
track LBL 11 station gap deviation from nominal.
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Figure 5.5 Aft join seat track and skin station gap deviation from nominal per QA records
Figure 5.5 data were obtained from QA records in CC131 (final body join). The specification for
seat track station gap at LBLI1 is 2.00 +/- 0.060 and 0.170 +/- 0.080 for skin station gap. In
Figure 5.5 if, on a given join, the seat track gap were measured at 2.00 inches and the skin gaps
were 0.170 inches all of the points for that airplane would plot on zero since none of the features
deviate from nominal. Typically, however, seat track gaps average about 2.05 hence the blue line
plots at +50 because the deviation from nominal is 50 thousandths (too wide). Likewise, crown
panel skin staion gap typically measures around 0.125 so points are plotted at -35 because the
crown skin station gap is 35 thousandths tight of nominal (0.125 - 0.170 = -0.035 = -35
thousandths). This said, the trend in Figure 5.5 shows that crown and side panel station gaps run
tight relative to the LBL 11 seat track gap and have done so since the program's inception.
If the gap deviations from nominal that are plotted in Figure 5.5 are due to excess length of the
section 44 body panels then the calculated excess lengths would be the difference between the
LBL 11 seat track gap deviation and the skin gap deviation. For the left, crown, and right side
panels these numbers are 0.054, 0.091, and 0.064 inches respectively. The point of this
discussion is that excess length of the section 44 body panels by the amounts discussed earlier in
section 5.1 are consistent with the condition of the aft join as measured by final body join QA
inspections.
5.2.2 Final Body Join skin gap HVC data
Final Body Join HVC data for skin station gap in Figure 5.6 are similar to the QA data in Figure
5.5 except that the HVC data give more points around the airplane circumference. HVC and QA
data in Table 5.5 are virtually identical. The side panels are tighter and less variable at stringer
14 than at stringer 24. Thus, QA data may understate the effect of an excess length condition by
measuring only at stringer 24 on the side panels. The crown panel appears uniformly gapped
based on HVC measurements at stringers 5L, IL, and 5R. All skin gaps are consistently smaller
than of nominal until L/N 406 at which point a vendor level change to the section 44 body panel
length trimming process was made.
KHI trimming process
change L/N 406
Figure 5.6 CC131 Aft Join Skin Station Gaps
Summary of CC 131 Aft Join HVC Skin Station Gap Data (QA data shaded)
Left Side Panel Crown Panel Right Side Panel
Stringer 24L 24L(QA) 14L 5L IL(QA) IL 5R 14R 24R (QA) 24R
AVG All 777s 0.161 0.163 0.132 0.133 0.128 0.130 0.130 0.128 0.154 0.145
STD DEV 0.040 0.028 0.035 0.033 0.025 0.034 0.028 0.027 0.031 0.026
AVG last 50 777s 0.154 0.161 0.115 0.120 0.116 0.113 0.117 0.115 0.164 0.155
STD DEV 0 028 0.033 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.036 0.029
AVG post chg 0.183 0.197 0.187 0.181 0.200 0.206 0.162
STD DEV\' 0.030 0.029 0.035 0.031 0.032 0.035 1 0.018
Table 5.5 CC131 HVC and QA Aft Join Skin Station Gaps (spec = 0.170+/-0.080)
Table 5.5 shows the average final body join skin gaps for the aft join based on HVC
measurements (and QA measurements shaded). The set of all 777s includes roughly the first 120
airplanes built. The last 50 777s includes the fifty most recent 777s before the KHI process
change. The post change figures are for ten airplanes after UN 406 (see Figure 5.6). Notice the
process shift toward nominal with a slight overshoot.
For the QA data shown in table 5.5, the LBL 11 seat track station gap averaged 0.046 too large
This is what one would expect if the body panels are too long. Interference at the skin gap
prevents the seat track gaps from closing to nominal. On L/N 133 KHI shifted the crown panel
aft end trimming location by 0.075 shorter. This change is reflected in the FBJ HVC data shown
in Figure 5.6 and Table 5.5.
5.2.3 Final Body Join laser alignment data
In practice airplane sections are aligned to gain QA buyoff for skin gap and seat track gaps and
airplane alignment is either taken as given or best fitted using the laser alignment system in
conjunction with QA requirements. Since the 777 alignment is based in large part on hardware
features, dimensional variation in seat tracks, frames, floor beams, and panels feeds into airplane
alignment. These hardware features are in turn determined by both vendor supplied parts and
upstream build processes. Final Body Join operators give the laser alignment system high marks
for its ability to join, pivot, and manipulate airplane body sections but the over-constrained
nature of the final body join process and the conflicting requirements to satisfy both QA and the
laser alignment system are often a point of contention.
Laser alignment data provided by Final Body Join allow one to make several interesting
observations. Limited data were (only up to L/N 343) available in the HVC custom extract data
base so a first observation is that difficulty in obtaining the data is a barrier to its effective
utilization. This theme recurred often during the project. Once the data were obtained they
needed to be separated and sorted to be of any use at all. With Microsoft Excel this process took
several hours because airplanes were grouped by effectivity rather than line number and the data
were "stacked" in a column nearly two thousand cells down. The effectivities for each point had
to be first related to their corresponding L/N. After this the column had to be broken apart into a
table with a row corresponding to a given L/N. Next an excel sort by UN was performed to put
the airplanes into a chronological sequence. After this the data were ready for plotting or
interpretation. The point is that the format of data storage militates against systems level analysis
and interpretation.
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 show the result of the above manipulations for WL 200 and LBL 11.
For WL 200 it is apparent that the most recent deviations from nominal are at STA 1845 which is
due to FBJ manipulating the after body WL to meet skin gap and seat track QA requirements.
The HVC data base lists an engineering specification of +/- 0.03 for the laser measurement and it
is apparent that the process is not capable of meeting it. The reader is referred to Figure 2.1 for a
diagram of major body sections and station locations. It is easy to demonstrate that the tail
depression measured by the laser tracker at station 1845.5 (given that the pivot point is the
section 44/46 body joint at station 1433) equates to a drop of the tail at the aft-most point on the
airplane (STA 2570) equal to 2.75 times the values shown in the plot. Thus the maximum
deviations are 0.4 to 0.5 inches at the tail. Note also that the top of the crown skins are located at
WL 340 so the skin gap effect of the deviations shown in Figure 5.7 is (340-200)/(1845.5-1433)
= 0.339. Thus the skin gap opens by about one third of the deviation shown in the figure which
puts the maximum skin gap effect of moving the tail at around 0.050 inches to 0.060 inches.
This assumes that the pivot point is the seat tracks. If the pivot point is taken at the crown skins
then the seat track gap can be closed by 0.050 inches while the skin gap remains constant.
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Figure 5.7 FBJ Laser Alignment data for WL 200. Positive deviations are downward
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Data for LBL 11 alignment are shown in Figure 5.8. It is interesting that the deviations for left
and right alignment are larger than for WL 200. Final Body Join personnel maintain that they
build a straight airplane and that this error may be due to the measurement of BL which occurs at
a point 55 inches elevated from WL 200 due to the configuration of the temporary laser targets
used. The largest deviations are on the nose and tail (STA 591.5 and 1845.5) and are mostly
positive for both the forward and aft sections early in the program. Around L/N 356 the pattern
changed and the tail is to the right more often and the nose is to the left.
Data in Figure 5.8 can be used to calculate the potential effect of the alignment on airplane
performance based on a study in 757 as follows'7 : "Aerodynamics evaluated the drag penalty
associated with misalignment of the 757 body due to either the 43/44 or 44/46 join.
Misalignment results in rolling and yawing moments which must be trimmed out during flight
with continuous deflections of the aileron and the rudder. The deflections cause increased fuel
burn and drag. If the body is joined such that the gap in body skins (assuming the body section
skin edges of both pieces are on clean station lines) is 0.060 on one side and 0.300 on the other
then the body would be misaligned 0.10 degrees.
This would result in the following penalties:
Equivalent operating empty weight (EOEW): 44 lbs
Increased fuel burn per year based on 13,001,000 nm mission per year: 690 US gallons
Typically aerodynamics assessed rejection tag items having an EOEW of less than 7 lbs. as being
aerodynamically insignificant."
17 Interoffice memorandum from Gerard Figurelli of Boeing Aerodynamics Engineering Support Group to Richerd
Matros of 777 Process Engineering dated 18SEP97.
An EOEW change of 44 lbs. equates to 690 gallons of incremental fuel consumption. Thus
Boeing's threshold of a seven pound change in EOEW translates to about 110 gallons of
incremental fuel consumption per year to the airline customer'.
How do these findings apply to 777 body manipulations? The largest WL 200 deflection on any
777 airplane (Figure 5.7) to correct a skin gap seat track gap condition was on UN 381. At STA
1845.5 the drop was 0.181 inches corresponding to an angular deflection of 0.181/412 x 3600 /27t
= 0.0250. If one considers a left side gap at the minimum tolerance 0.170 - 0.080 = 0.090 and a
right side skin gap at the maximum tolerance 0.170 + 0.080 = 0.250 then the angular deflection is
0.035'. Likewise if one considers a crown panel skin gap at the minimum and a seat track gap at
the maximum the angular deflection is 0.057'. Assuming that the fuel burn penalty scales to the
second power with angle (based on Bernoulli's equation for drag so that cutting the angle
deflection in half reduces the drag penalty by a factor of 4) then one can conclude that nominally
built 44 and 46 sections joined to the worst case QA requirements would result in a EOEW
penalty of 44 x (0.057/0.10)2 = 14 lbs. which is slightly above the maximum aerodynamics
allowed of 7 lbs. For left/right alignment the penalty is 44 x (0.025/0.10)2 = 2.5 lbs. which is
well below the maximum allowed. It is important to point out, however, that the 757 study was
based on left/right misalignment and it was stated in a follow up meeting with Mr. Figurelli in
attendance that WL angular deflections resulted in much lower penalties. Laser alignment WL
deflection data in Figure 5.7 reveal a maximum tail deflection of 0.0250 to control gaps within
QA requirements. Thus the skin gap tolerances (or features of the airplane based on QA) seem
adequate to prevent aerodynamic penalties for nominally built body sections as far as the WL
data are concerned.
1 According to the Boeing web page (http://www.boeing.com/commercial/757-200/background.html), a 757-200 has
a range of 4.520 statute miles (4,000 nm) and a fuel capacity of 11,276 gallons. Assuming the aircraft lands with
2017 fuel remaining,. the 13,001,000 nm per year mission requires about 30 million gallons of fuel. This means that
reject tags are assessed against items that change fuel consumption by 110/(30x10 6) = 0.0004%.
For the BL data shown in Figure 5.8 the largest nose deflection is 0.567 inches on L/N 390 which
equates to an angular deflection of 0.567/(1035-591.5) x 360 0/21t = 0.0730. The angular
deflection required to correct the worst case skin gap condition of 0.080 inches on each side is
0.160inches/(22ft x 12 inches/ft) x 360 0/2rt = 0.0350. In terms of correcting skin gaps it is
difficult to imagine why a deflection as large as 0.567 inches would be necessary. In terms of
fuel burn penalty 0.567 inches equates to an EOEW of 44 x (0.073/0.1)2 = 231bs. (which is well
into the reject region). The 0.567 inch deflection also corresponds to a difference in skin gaps
from left to right of (0.160/0.026) x 0.073 = 0.45 inches. Examination of the forward join QA
records for this airplane, however, indicate that the actual difference was only 0.006 between
skin gaps at stringers 24L and 24R (i.e. 24L was at 0.167 and 24R was at 0.161). There is no
physical reason why BL deflections as large as those shown in Figure 5.8 should occur and that if
they are occurring there is an associated fuel burn penalty. Another possibility is that the laser
alignment data for BL deflection have a large measurement error due to the configuration of the
temporary target system.
Despite the fact that final body join personnel knowingly lower the tail of the airplane the BL
offsets are larger and more variable than those due to WL. Buttock line laser data do not match
what would be necessary to correct even the worst case skin gap mismatch and are inconsistent
with part to part skin gap measurements taken in FBJ. Figure 5.8 data for BL deflection are
larger than what would be required to prevent drag penalties based on the 757 study (any
deflection of the nose or tail in Figure 5.8 of greater than 0.297 inches left or right will result in
an angular deflection of over 0.0390 and will cause EOEW to be greater than 7 lbs.).
Airplanes built within QA tolerances will align straight enough to prevent drag penalties if the
adjacent structures are built to nominal. It is obvious, however, that this is not always the case
and that the body sections have many sources of variation accumulated through best fitting and
rework. Thus, airplane features are not a robust proxy for airplane straightness and to the extent
that laser data can be used as an in-process check it may be very valuable. Table 5.6 contains a
summary the laser alignment data.
Summary of Final Body Join Laser Alignment data for airplanes built through 12/97
Body Section Forward Body Center Stub (Monument) Aft Body
WL data at STA 591.5 1014.5L 1014.5R 1044.5L 1044.5R 1392.5 1455.5L 1455.5R 1845.5
Grand AVG 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.011
STD DEV 0.026 0.037 0.034 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.023 0.051 0.040
AVG of last 50 A/Ps 0.000 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.008 -0.016 0.025
STD DEV 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.024 0.063 0.049
Body Section Forward Body Center Stub (Monument) Aft Body
BL data at STA 591.5 n/a 1014.5 1044.5 n/a 1392.5 1455.5R n/a 1845.5
Grand AVG -0.032 n/a 0.003 0.000 n/a 0.000 0.019 n/a 0.078
STD DEV 0.145 n/a 0.041 0.005 n/a 0.005 0.035 n/a 0.095
AVG of last 50 A/Ps -0.119 n/a -0.016 0.000 n/a 0.000 0.014 n/a 0.049
STD DEV 0.154 n/a 0.041 0.006 n/a 0.006 0.034 n/a 0.112
Positive deviations are downward deflections in WL and right for BL
Table 5.6 Summary of final body join laser alignment data
5.3 Summary of Chapter
Informal measurements described in the beginning of this chapter presented evidence that section
44 body panels were consistently longer than engineering nominal. Final body join QA data
reveal a characteristic that could be caused by section 44 excess body panel length. The final
body join QA data also reveal that the aft join process mean for all three section 44 body panels
is long relative to the LBL 11 I seat track. The amount of deviation in the QA data from nominal
closely matches the excess length measured in CC335. Final body join HVC data indicate that
aft join skin gaps around the circumference of the airplane are smaller than nominal and this too
is consistent with excess panel length by the amount measured.
Laser data show that airplane alignment absorbs body structure dimensional variation
(particularly in the the aft join so that QA features remain within tolerance). The amount by
which body alignment is adjusted seems insignificant in the WL direction. Buttock line laser
alignment data show deflections that are aerodynamically significant based on the Boeing criteria
of assessing NCR tags if EOEW exceeds 7 lbs. The BL laser alignment deflections, however, are
large compared to skin and seat track station gap deviations observed in production and are
inconsistent with final body join QA records. This dichotomy leads one to question the accuracy
of the BL data.
The large deflections in the BL data shown in Figure 5.8 (which equate to over one half inch at
the nose and tail and are often in opposite directions) may be due, in part, to measurement noise.
Since this source of error is not quantified it is not possible to tell if 777s are straight or built
with the nose shifted slightly to the left and the tail shifted to the right.
6. Chapter 6 - Datum Flow Chain Analysis
This Chapter utilizes tools developed at MIT 19 to study the problem from the standpoint of the
flow of datums through the assembly process. The chapter borrows heavily from previous work
by one Ph.D. student and one Master of Science student from the MIT department of Mechanical
Engineering. The students studied the 777 forward join in Everett and the section 43 and 44
body panel assembly processes during a factory visit to KHI. A tutorial created by the students,
Krish Mantripragada and Jeff Adams, from their Boeing trip report is given in 7.
6.1 Section 44 body panel assembly sequence
This section provides an assembly sequence overview of the steps in the section 44 assembly
from one production site to the next. Details on the Everett assembly procedures and associated
KCs were discussed in Section 3.1. The production assembly tree for the problem under study is
shown in Figure 6.1. The problem arises when the 44 and 46 sections are joined in CC131. It
should be clear that the problem with the join is one of integration between section 44 and
section 46.
There is no evidence of a problem with the crown panel forward edge station of section 46 (the
sides and crown panel at station 1434 are cut to net trim in CC328 after assembly) but the
possibility is under investigation by Boeing engineers. The placement of the section 46 keel
panel as a contributor to the short edge margin problem is also under investigation.
Unfortunately for final body join operators, variation from both section 44 and section 46 washes
to station 1434. Perhaps a better design would have been to wash variation in the same direction
in all of the body sections so that double accumulation of variation is not absorbed in final body
join as is the case with the aft join.
19 Mantripragada. R.; Whitney, D.; The Datum Flow Chain: A Systematic Approach to Assembly Design and













































































Because the structures involved are large and compliant, requiring the use of rigid fixtures in
remote locations from each other, small variations in the body structures are sometimes almost
unobservable until mating parts are brought together in final assembly. Unfortunately, however,
this is often the most difficult time and place to correct the problem. These considerations were
discussed by Cunningham20
The author proceeds with a systematic mapping of the production chain from start to finish. The
DFC is utilized to understand if and where problems might be likely to arise. If the DFC
indicates that we should expect problems in a given area, this provides evidence that an earlier
design stage consideration may have resulted in a more robust assembly. Ex-post this is of little
value but if properly institutionalized in an organizational learning process it may benefit future
derivatives or new products. On the other hand, absence of a DFC identifiable problem may
allox ruling out of extraneous possibilities and facilitate a more focused search for root causes.
Cunningham identifies five categories of mechanical assembly problems:
* tolerance stack up - all parts are within allowable engineering tolerance but the accumulated
variation causes the assembly to be outside of specification limits. In this case the tolerances
are incorrectly allocated. If the tolerances are based on refined manufacturing capability,
however, it may be necessary to change the production process since the individual part
variation is representative of the best the individual component processes can deliver. DFC
methodology can be helpful in this regard as will be shown with frame mismatches in Section
6.1.2.
* design problem - the part's geometric design is incorrect. e.g. physical interference between
parts, overlap, wrong tolerances, etc.
* part quality problem - the parts are manufactured out of tolerance.
* assembly process problem - a given step in the assembly process causes the problem. e.g.
environmental conditions, poor procedures or compliance, mislocating in fixture, etc.
20 Cunningham. Timothy W., Migratable Methods and Tools for Performing Corrective Actions in Automotive and
Aircraft Assembly. Thesis for the Degree of Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering, MIT, 1996.
* tooling or fixture problem - locating features are worn or mispositioned or the tool is
incorrectly designed or installed.
While the DFC cannot explicitly solve all of these types of problems it will help provide insights
as to where one might look and answer the question "what could have been done differently?"
6.1.1 Skin panel assembly sequence and indexing from KHI to Everett
This section discusses the general assembly sequence used by KHI to fabricate section 44 body
panels. The subject problem is one of panel size as it pertains to the location of the aft skin edge.
It is well known. however, that variation in frame station location and side panel attachment
points to the center stub floor beams also feed into panel skin edge location. This is due to the
best fitting practices described earlier. For this reason the details that set skin and frame station
location are studied. Where indexing is important it is described using a DFC.
6.1.1.1 KHI Gifu Plant
Skin sub-panel fabrication, drilling, and assembly takes place at Gifu. Stringers, frames, shear
tie,. and skins are manufactured there. Shear ties are not considered critical in determining
station constraints and are not considered. Thus the operations of interest to us are:
* NC drilling of stringer coordination holes and positioning of stringer clips
* NC drilling of skins
* Auto riveting of stringers to skin
Stringers are drilled and assembled on an automatic assembly machine. The sequence of steps is
as follows:
1. Position stringer - the forward edge of the stringer provides the station index.
2. Drill holes - an NC located #40 diameter coordination hole is drilled with a stated accuracy of
+/- 0.005. Pilot holes (#30 diameter) for subsequent stringer positioning to skin and stringer
clips are drilled to +/- 0.005.
3. Position clips - clips are positioned to +/- 0.005 by NC function.
4. Insert rivets.
Skin section panels arrive preformed for contour and near net trim. The skin panel is indexed for
station from the forward EOP into the bed of a large NC drilling machine. The machine controls
the location and drilling of all holes to #40 diameter for attachment of stringers, shear ties, and
neighboring skin panels. Stringer forward coordination holes are drilled to +/- 0.004 and other
holes common to a stringer are located to +/- 0.008 inches.
Stringers are installed hole to hole with the forward #40 diameter coordination hole serving as
the WL and STA index. Stringers are positioned by matching the forward most key hole
(stringer coordination holes) and then set by aligning the #30 pilot holes on the stringer with the
#40 holes on the skin. The stringers are temporarily fastened and then moved to an automatic
riveting machine for drilling and riveting. The riveting pattern is an alternating forward to aft
and aft to forward process. e.g. the first stringer at the origin of the machine is riveted from
forward most hole to aft and then the adjacent second stringer is riveted from aft to forward and
so on.
After riveting. inspection, manual installation of brackets, and sealing are performed. The skin
subassembly panel is then packed and shipped to the Seaside plant. A datum flow chain for the
Gifu operations is shown Figure 5.2. Letters in parentheses, e.g. (a), (b), etc., indicate the
sequential position of the assembly step shown.
(a) KHI Gifu plant
NC drilling of skins, stringers, and clip placement
(top picture applies to each individual panel of the three)
crown skin panel subassembly -stringer and clip subassembly
(3 pieces, left, center, right)
stringer fwd
skin lap stringer - (5) coordination * stringer
coordination coordinati hole clips
hole hole
(1) 5 (1) (5)
.Q-/"--mnl\ tringer
forward EOP skin panel . : ger
(1) (5) .. (1) (5)
V
NC bodN- skin drilling
(b) KHI Gifu plant
auto riveting of stringers






















Figure 6.2 Datum flow chain for KHI Gifu plant crown panel subassemblies
tion
6.1.1.2 KHI Seaside Plant
At KHI's Seaside plant the skin panel subassemblies are fastened to one another, the aft skin
edge is trimmed to nominal, and circumferential frames are attached. Frame attachment,
although not part of the original internship project, is included in the datum flow chain
representation. The reason for this is that as a result of mapping the DFC for aft skin edge it was
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discovered that an over-constrained condition exists in frame attachment and that frame
mismatch may be at least partly caused by the datum flow sequencing and attendant variation
stack-up.
Seaside assembly begins with the loading of stringers common to a skin lap into a rivet assembly
jig (RAJ). also called a picture frame. Skin panel subassemblies are removed from their shipping
containers and set in place. Side subassemblies are loaded first and then center section (side
panel assemblies consist of upper and lower side panel subassemblies). Side subassemblies are
located to the RAJ using tool tabs which mate with adjustable indexes for clocking and BL and
panel forward edge at stringer 13L and 13R for STA. The skin lap coordination holes are then
enlarged to #30 diameter and the center panel is loaded and located using stringer IL. Left and
right subassembly panels are then adjusted by positioning the tooling tabs until the enlarged #30
skin lap coordination holes line up with the #40 skin lap coordination holes on the center
subassembly. KC measurements are made at side EOP, aft EOP, and skin laps to check panel
alignment.
Skin subassemblies are secured with belts and key stringers 13L and 13R are clamped. KC
measurements are taken again and positions are fine tuned until KCs are within tolerance under
the restrained condition. Coordination holes between skin panels and holes common to sub-
panel splice area stringers and shear ties are back drilled for tack fastening. The panels are then
disassembled. de-burred, sealed, reassembled, and tack fastened. The entire assembly is moved
to an automatic riveting machine for final fastening.
Mantripragada and Adams made several astute comments concerning the RAJ process in their
KHI trip report. Two are repeated here for emphasis:
1. There are conflicting indexes on the panel subassemblies in that panels are located to the RAJ
and hole to hole causing an over-constrained situation. During the recent internship,
clarification was sought from KHI as to which index was dominant. The vendor stated that
the panels are located to the forward EOP for STA and at 13L, IL, and 13R for clocking and
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BL. The panels are then indexed hole to hole, and checked against RAJ features. Note that
this still does not answer the question. The panels must either be indexed to the RAJ features
or assembled hole to hole. Only a perfect set of parts with no variation could satisfy this
over-constraint.
2. Fine tuning of the restrained assembly may induce pre-load affecting final shape.
Next the assembly is moved to the floor assembly jig (FAJ). Prior to its arrival the frames are
loaded and indexed using three K-holes in the frames. The K-hole indexes on the FAJ have a net
size hole that mates with the center K-hole and the outer two are slotted. The crown panel
assembly is indexed at the forward EOP for STA and stringer IL for BL and clocking. Stringer
13L and I 3R also attempt to control positioning that is already set by stringer IL and the contour
header for WL.
Aft skin edge is trimmed to nominal while in the FAJ before frame riveting takes place. Frame
location is checked against the FAJ but no shims were observed between any of the stringer clips
and frames. This leads one to question how frame station is really determined. If frames are
indexed to the FAJ and then securely fastened to clips whose station positions are subject to
inherent variation, the assembly is over-constrained in the FAJ. When the assembly is removed,
however, the frame location will adjust to that of the clips.
A DFC for the Seaside process is shown in Figure 5.3. Note that over-constraints in the RAJ
sub-panel assembly process and in the FAJ frame installation step are clearly identified. DFC
mapping during the process design stage would have identified these over-constraints as
constituents of potential integration risk for final assembly before production operations started.
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(c) KHI Seaside plant
RAJ assembly of subpanels


















(d) KHI Seaside plant aft skin
edge trimming and frame installation
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6.1.1.3 Boeing Everett CC335
Body panels are indexed from FAJ features in CC335 according to the design build procedure
discussed in Section 3.1. Side panels are set for WL and BL from laser targets at stringer 27 and
STA from the forward EOP at stringer 19 per the load document. In practice mechanics use this
as a first pass and then check for floor beam mismatch. This condition occurs at any of the seven
points in the lower aft area of the side panel where it attaches to the center stub transverse floor
beams. Side panels are then fine tuned +/- 0.030 to minimize floor beam shimming
requirements. The crown panel is located for BL and WL off of stringer IL.
The load document calls for double indexing crown panel station at stringer IL both forward and
aft. Note the impossibility of what this calls for operators to accomplish. They are thus forced to
decide on their own what is most important and then act accordingly. In practice the crown is
typically indexed at 12L and 12R from the forward edge and then fine tuned +/- 0.030 inches to
match frame splices. A DFC for the CC335 design process is shown in Figure 6.4. The as-is
process is shown later in Figure 6.6.
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(e) Boeing CC335 assembly
integrated crown panelassembly
aft EOP aft EOP str 14L-14R
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Figure 6.4 Design datum flow for Boeing section 44 crown assembly
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6.1.1.4 Start to finish datum flow
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The individual datum flow chains are shown from the start of the manufacturing process to the
finish in Figure 6.5. Datum flow for the aft skin edge is consistent in the as-designed process.
The reason for the panel excess length problem must be due to factors other than design
indexing.
Two possibilities are cited. The first is incorrect fabrication, e.g. the vendor trims the body
panels too long, and the other is due to the as-is datum flow used in CC335. Evidence was
presented earlier that supported the former notion of misfabrication. In the case of CC335 as-is
indexing. the shop begins with the design process depicted above. They then "best fit" the body
panels to minimize shimming at transverse floor beams and frame splices. Per local consensus
they move body panels within a +/- 0.030 window. The as-is datum flow is shown in Figure 6.6.
107
C335 as-is crown panel a
aft EOP
KC.5.335.7
(see figure 4.6 ~O) (6)
FAJ aft frame ends on left (















frame ends on right
side of crown panel
right side panel
assembly
right side panel frame
ends
(6)
.. , right side panel
6(6) _4 assembly
(6)









- - measurement flo
Figure 6.6 CC335 as-is datum flow for section 44 crown panel assembly
Note that in the as-is process the body panels are all over constrained. The left side panel, for
example. is aligned to features on the FAJ and to center stub transverse floor beams and likewise
for the right side panel. The crown panel, in turn, is aligned to frame ends on either side in
addition to FAJ indexes. The obvious ramifications of such a scheme are that some of the
indexes, namely the design features of the FAJ, will be violated. This also leads to a propensity
for left/right assymetry due to matching floor beams and frames on either side. This condition is
often observed in CC335 production: the left side panel is shifted forward up to 0.030 inches, the






6.1.2 Accumulated variation in datum flow: why CC335 must "best fit" in order to build
The DFC revealed consistent indexing for the as-designed process with respect to the aft skin
edge but it is impossible for mechanics to build as designed because of tolerance requirements at
other features: transverse floor beams and frames in this case. Maximum allowable floor beam
station mismatch without an NCR is 0.063 and for frames the maximum is 0.056. Smaller
mismatches are often observed and although they do not require an NCR to be written they are
still a significant problem because of the shimming required.
The DFCs developed above can be used to demonstrate what the expected variation stack up at
mating frame ends might be. The argument is based on the premise that the stringer clips, and
not the Seaside FAJ, set the location of the frames. At Gifu (see Figure 6.2) stringer clips are
located to stringers from the stringer forward EOP and stringers are located on skins by forward
end coordination holes. The published accuracies for locating parts and holes in the sequence is:
Stringer coordination hole in skin panel +/- 0.004
Forward coordination hole in stringer +/-0.005
Location of clip along stringer +/-0.005
The simple sum of the maximum deviations for a given clip is 0.014 so that clips on adjacent
stringers of a given panel could be displaced by a maximum of 0.028 for station (assuming no
other sources of variation existed). Now imagine that the two adjacent stringer clips nearest the
frame end at the crown to side skin lap (stringer 14) are displaced this way. That is, at a given
frame the clip on stringer 15 of the side panel is forward 0.014 and the clip on stringer 14 is aft
0.014. Now the frame end which extends halfway from stringer 14 to stringer 13 will be
displaced 0.028 from nominal. This frame must be spliced to the adjacent frame on the crown
panel which could be displaced by as much as 0.028 in the opposite direction. The deviation
between the two frame ends would thus be 0.056.
This scenario is illustrated in Figure 6.7 which depicts a crown panel and left side panel skin lap
and frame splice situation as it might appear in CC335. If the mechanics try to match the frame
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ends it will cause a large misfair at the forward and aft ends of the crown to side panel skin lap.
If they attempt to index both panels at the forward EOP per design, the frame station mis-match
will result in NCR activity. Because NCR activity causes production delays and rework the
mechanics opt to violate the design indexing scheme.
Extending the scenario a bit farther, assume that the crown panel is already trimmed longer than
nominal as data in Chapter 5 indicated is often the case. In figure 6.7 the crown must slide aft to
match the frames. This aft movement adds to the excess length and compounds the problem in
final body join due to the section 44 aft crown protrusion. Final body join is now faced with a
dilemma similar to that which confronted CC335 because of the over-constrained nature of the
assembly. As discussed in Chapter 5, final body join opts to lower the tail of the airplane to
avoid NCR activity, production delays, and rework.
While the example is hypothetical it raises several questions:
* What does published accuracy for locating panel assembly parts mean and what are the
distributions (e.g. 95% of holes are within +/- 0.04, uniform, normal)?
* Is the published accuracy best case optimism or realistic steady state manufacturing data
based on actual process capability?
* What additional sources of variation exist that are not considered above (e.g. angular
deflection of clip with published accuracy +/- 10, straightness of frame, indexing, etc.)?













Figure 6.7 Accumulated variation effects in stringer clip placement on frame splices
6.1.2.1 Datum flow analysis in use at 777 manufacturing
Boeing 777 Process Engineers D. Watters and C. Schweigert have developed several superb
illustrative tools that show qualitatively where variation enters the assembly process. One such
figure is shown in Appendix 8. In order to arrive at the above conclusion that variation
accumulates due to three datuming steps one simply adds the number of arrows needed to locate
the feature of interest which, in this case, is stringer clips. Watters successfully applied this
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Watter's independently developed DFC is similar to the DFC in use at MIT with the following
main differences:
* Watters' approach is very easy to visualize and does not require much background knowledge
to be readily comprehended. The fact that one may never have seen the assembly in question
is not a hindrance because it is diagrammed in the datum flow.
* Watters' diagrams take more time to prepare because they are so graphic. As a result they
also require more electronic capacity to manipulate and store.
* Watters' diagrams are good for one degree of freedom (STA, BL, or WL) whereas the MIT
DFCs can be used for degrees of freedom from one to six (STA, BL, WL, and three rotational
axes). As a result, the DFC used at MIT readily shows over-constrained assemblies (such as
locating of frames in Figure 6.3 or the body panels in Figure 6.6).
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7. Chapter 7 - Developments at Boeing since the internship
This chapter describes the vendor level process change that was implemented to correct the
problem of section 44 body panel excess length and its attendant impact on aft join performance.
The chapter begins by presenting a memorandum that was sent to KHI with details of the study
performed in Everett. KHI's response and the results of the process change are then presented.
Finally. follow up work by 777 Process Engineering is described. The group discovered a
tooling measurement error in the CC335 FAJs. Their work explains the statistically significant
difference between the measurements in the two FAJs that was described in section 5.1.3.1.
7.1 Change to the section 44 panel length trimming process
This section presents a memorandum that was sent to 777 factory management, Boeing
International Business Operations, and KHI in order to correct the subject problem by requesting
a change to the section 44 panel length trimming process. This is followed by a discussion of
how KHI responded to the request and the effect that the KHI's process change had on Everett
factory performance.
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Request for KHI to adjust section 44 body panel length trimming process.
Engineering Drawing 101W5010
Engineering Drawing 144W0019
CC 131 AFT JOIN KEY FEATURES QA Log
Key Characteristic KC.5.335.7UATL
Key Characteristic KC.5.KHI.7
Tool Drawing 144W0000 Sheet 902
Engineering Drawings 144W1010, 3010, and 4010
Final Body Join (FBJ, CC131) has difficulty performing the aft join. Recurring
issues are skin gap uniformity (Ref. A), skin and seat track station gap (Ref. B),
and keel short edge margin. A salient indication is that the section 44 crown panel
protrudes aft of the sides at stringer 14 by an average of 0.0621.22. When the
condition is severe crown skin station gap reaches minimum allowable before
other features are within tolerance 23. This results in MRB activity with attendant
production delays and cost ramifications.
21 All dimensions are inches unless otherwise stated.
22 Ref. C: standard deviation 0.023; range of values 0.030-0.120.
23 Reference C indicates that the aft join is significantly off center with crown skin gap averaging 0.055 close and
LBL 11 seat track 0.049 wide of nominal. Left and right side panels average 0.014 and 0.010 closer than nominal
and other seat tracks are wide per the LBL 11 signature (standard deviations around 0.027; a larger study gave a
matching trend. The study makes no consideration of section 46 skin station, seat track positioning, or other factors
that might cause this. As such, interpretation of these results as a measure of section 44 excess panel length implies




Situation: The 777 Process Engineering Group conducted
section 44 crown to side panel misfairs24
reached:
a study to determine the causes of
The following conclusions were
* individual crown panel lengths are fairly uniform from stringer to stringer.
* left and right side panel lengths are closely matched.
* crown and side panel lengths are statistically capable of meeting the final body join gap
tolerance of +/- 0.080 although the process means are biased long.
* overall crown and side panel lengths consistently exceed engineering nominal.
* crown panel length exceeds side panel length.
A summary of the measurements considered is shown below. Positive numbers indicate long or














HVC 0.063 @ 14L 0.090 @ 14L














0.050 C 19L 0.090 @ IL
0.030 @ 19L 0.082 @ IL
0 02 @ 14L 0 07 @ 14L
0.07 @ 14R
0 058 @ 19L 0.088 @ IL
0.040 @ 14L 0.067 @
0.057 @ 14R












14L 0.05 @ 14R
0.010
14R
Measures aft skin station deviation
from nominal. Affected by
multiple factors. See footnote 4.
Absolute forward to aft panel
excess length measured as offset
from endgates (Ref. F)
Measures aft skin station deviation
from nominal. See footnote 4.
End to end steel tape measurement
from station 1035 to 1434 minus
engineering nominal 398.830 per
Ref. G.
Measures difference between skin
gap station deviation from nominal
versus LBL 11 seat track station
gap deviation from nominal. See
note 2.
Data provided by A. Taniguchi.
End to end tape measurement
minus nominal.
KC data extracted from HVCS.
Measures aft skin station deviation
from nominal.
4 Everett assembly procedures contribute to section 44 panel station variability. The scope of this memo is




Proposal: The 777 Process Engineering Group requests that KHI adjust section 44 panel
length trimming processes such that crown and side panel station lengths are
centered around mean values 0.075 and 0.030 shorter, respectively, than their
historical values.
Risk: Consideration was given to thermal expansion and contraction, seasonal variation
in temperature difference between KHI and Everett, accuracy of measurements,
assembly variation, sample size, correlation between data sets, difficulty of
making process changes and impact on FBJ if skin gap is too wide. The requested
adjustment is intended to keep long and short panels within engineering tolerance
under likely temperature conditions (i.e. to keep the entire range of data within
specification limits rather than to center the mean). A slightly larger and higher
risk change would be required to center process means.
Analysis: A computer model was run using Ref. C and the proposed change from L/N 40-
101. With no other changes three airplanes in the group of over sixty had skin
gaps that went out of tolerance wide. In all three cases, however, sufficient
margin existed on seat track gaps that the out of tolerance condition would never
have occurred (the model had the artificial constraint of changing only skin gap).
The change also caused 4 out of tolerance tight skin gap conditions and 13 wide
seat track conditions to disappear and would have undoubtedly prevented
numerous short edge margin problems due to the additional room for gap closure.
Deliverables
Summary:
KHI should implement the proposed change to deliver section 44 crown panels
that are 0.075 shorter and side panels that are 0.030 shorter than their respective
historical means at the earliest possible date and inform Everett of which airplane
number the change is made.
The CC131 aft join is significantly complicated by section 44 crown and side
panels that are too long. Available data25 support the proposed process change
and risk considerations indicate minimal exposure. Elimination of all uncertainty
is not possible and it is appropriate to consider the proposed change within the
context of the alternative risk of doing nothing. Historical performance of the aft
join (non uniform and tight skin gap, wide seat track gaps, short keel panel edge
margins, trimming of panels in Everett, repetition of the September 1997 MRB in








2S In contrast to the other data sources (which are supported by direct visual observation of the panels side by side in
Everett and steel tape measurements at KHI) KC.5.KHI.7 shows crown and side panels to be within 0.010 of each
other and tightly centered around nominal.
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7.1.2 KHI response to change request
KHI maintained that the section 44 body panels were net trim and that the skin trimming process
was centered on nominal. They defended their KC data in spite of overwhelming evidence that
conflicted with it and challenged the integrity of the data collection process. Under pressure
from Everett management following the September 1997 incident in final body join, KHI agreed
to adjust the trimming process to remove an additional 0.075 inches from the crown panel and
0.030 inches from the side panels compared to the historical process means. This change was to
have occurred after the third steel tape measurement was taken at KHI (i.e. on L/N 396 in
October of 1997). Subsequently, however, KHI invoked numerous tactics to delay the change.
On L/N 398 they began cutting crown panels 0.020 shorter and suggested that this should
constitute completed action. Finally, the Body Structures Business Unit Manager initiated
procedures to perform photogrammetric measurement of incoming section 44 body panels with
the intention of rejecting any panels that did not measure within engineering tolerances. When
news of this plan reached KHI they committed to implement the proposed change on L/N 406.
KHI implemented the process change by shifting their KC specification by the amount requested
in the memorandum of Section 7.1.1. They maintained that their KC measurement system was
accurate and that in their view they would actually be trimming the panels shorter than what was
allowable per engineering. The new value for the side panel trimming process was agreed to be
-0.030+/-0.040 and for the crown -0.075+/-0.040. This disturbed the author because the change
was intended to adjust panel lengths relative to the historical process. Recent data trends (shown
in Section 5.1.1, Table 5.1), however, indicated that KHI had been adjusting their measurement
process over the past several months and that it was currently in close agreement with Everett
measurements. If KHI adjusted the trimming process to produce short panels based on the
measurement process that was now more accurate than in the past the panels would actually be
too short.
KHI made process changes on several occasions without informing Boeing. They began
trimming crown panels shorter by 0.020 inches on UN 398 and did not notify Boeing of the
change until afterward. On L/N 399 they trimmed all three body panels to nominal. When the
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airplane section was assembled in CC335 the author noted the condition (which was statistically
out of control based on available process data) and sent a message to KHI to which they
responded with an apology for not informing Boeing in advance.
In view of these events, it is conceivable that KHI discovered errors in their panel length
measurement and trimming processes, corrected them, did not inform Boeing, and then went
along with the changes that Boeing insisted they make. Under such a scenario there would be a
risk of receiving panels that were now too short.
7.1.3 Results of the process change
The body panels for L/N 406 reached Everett several months after the internship ended. Figure
5.6 and Table 5.5 display the only data available to the author with which to evaluate the change.
It is evident that the final body join skin gaps underwent a step change from being about 0.050
inches too small to values about 0.010 larger than nominal. These shifts are shown in Table 5.5
and are consistent with a change in section 44 crown panel length of -0.070 inches.
Communication with Process Engineering and final body join personnel revealed that the process
change may have overcorrected because after L/N 406 the skin gaps in final body join tended
toward the wide end of the tolerance band and seat tracks closed to the small end of the allowable
range. The short edge margin condition was said to have improved significantly for the ten
airplanes after the change.
7.2 Tooling developments at Boeing since the internship
When the internship ended in December UN 404 was in CC335 and L/N 394 was in final body
join. Two Process Engineers were devoting considerable effort to model the aft join based on
upstream measurements of section 44 and section 46 features at STA 1434. Laser trackers were
used to measure skin edge and seat track locations. If their model indicated that interference
would occur in the aft join (such as the September 1997 incident which cost the 777 factory an
entire day of lost production) trimming was performed in advance of the body sections reaching
final body join. It was expected that section 44 aft skin edge would center on nominal with the
arrival of L/N 406 at which point KHI was to implement the change described in Section 7.1.
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7.2.1 Laser Tracker Characterization of Panels and FAJ Majors26
To monitor the process change that KHI was to perform, overall crown panel lengths were
measured starting on L/N 406 using Laser Tracker27 . Measurement device accuracy and
measurement point locations were based on KHI's measurement survey on L/N 406. A strong
correlation was found between KHI's and Boeing's data both showing panels lengths an average
of .080 inches short of nominal. FAJ measurement data, however, showed panel lengths near
nominal begining at L/N 405.
Due to the difference between FAJ data and Laser Tracker data additional tool surveys were
performed on the K.C. tool features (recall that a tooling survey on FAJ1 in October of 1997
revealed no out of tolerance conditions as mentioned in Section 5.1.3). Measurements were held
relative to the primary seat track datums and results for units 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 7.1.
Notice that on FAJ1 the skin panel STA index at STR 1.5L is located .020 inches aft and the
measurement feature is located 0.013 forward. This would cause a panel measured in this tool to
appear 0.033 longer than its actual length. Likewise, offsets were detected on unit 2. The FAJ
out of tolerance conditions (e.g. features measured to be greater than 0.012 inches from their
nominal position) have been corrected.
2" Work. text. and figures in this section are due to Boeing 777 Process Engineers C. Schweigert and D. Watters.
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7.2.2 Effect of Laser Track results on baseline case study results
The offsets identified based on Laser Tracker are disturbing, particularly in view of the
satisfactory tooling survey that was completed on FAJI in October, 1997. The question arises as
to whether or not the findings refute the entire body of data presented in Chapter 5 or if the two
can be reconciled.
Assume that the laser tracker has no error. It is highly unlikely that this is the case but this is a
basic assumption that is taken for granted in the Boeing environment: measurement error is
insignificant. The following corrections then apply (once again I thank C. Schweigert and D.
Watters):
fwd 6 + aft 8 = total 8 (positive is toward
0.013 + -.002 = 0.011 (panels are
0.021 + 0.013 = 0.034 (panels are
-.006 + 0.012 = 0.006 (panels are
0.020 + 0.013 = 0.033 (panels are
0.019 + 0.005 = 0.024 (panels are
0.024 + -0.003 = 0.021 (panels are
panel/makes panel appear long)
0.011 shorter than measured in FAJ)
0.034 shorter than measured in FAJ)
0.006 shorter than measured in FAJ)
0.033 shorter than measured in FAJ)
0.024 shorter than measured in FAJ)
.021 shorter than measured in FAJ)
FAJ 2 fwd 8 + aft 6 = total 5 (positive is toward panel/makes panel appear long)
STR 19R 0.004 + 0.029 = 0.033 (panels are 0.033 shorter than measured in FAJ)
STR 11R -.016 + 0.008 = -.008 (panels are 0.008 longer than measured in FAJ)
STR 1.5R 0.009 + 0.003 = 0.012 (panels are 0.012 shorter than measured in FAJ)
STR 1.5L 0.008 + 0.004 = 0.012 (panels are 0.012 shorter than measured in FAJ)
STR 1 IL: 0.008 + 0.016 = 0.024 (panels are 0.024 shorter than measured in FAJ)
STR 19L 0.004 + 0.008 = 0.012 (panels are 0.012 shorter than measured in FAJ)
Table 5.4 in Section 5.1.3 lists the measurements for the left, crown, and right side panels before









Panels as measured before tooling errors were detected (numbers represent inches longer than
nominal as measured in the CC335 FAJ as discussed in Section 5.1.3):
FAJ1 FAJ2
Left side panel at 19L: 0.055 0.037
Crown panel at IL: 0.104 0.070
Right side panel at 19R: 0.026 0.054
Recall that in Section 5.1.3.1 it was shown that the differences in measurements between the two
FAJs is statistically significant. Given the tooling feature offset information obtained by
Schweigert and Watters (shown on the previous pages) the FAJ measurements can be corrected
to reflect a more accurate estimate of panel excess length. The values shown below indicate the
measurements in inches above nominal that would have been obtained in the internship study of
Chapter 5 if the FAJ tooling features had been correct:
FAJ1 FAJ2
Left side panel at 19L: 0.034 0.025
Crown panel at IL: 0.071 0.058
Right side panel at 19R: 0.015 0.021
The agreement between the two FAJs is now very close. Invoking the assumption from Chapter
5 that the panels are from the same population the values from the two FAJs can be averaged.
This results in the following process means (in inches longer than nominal):
Left side panel at 19L: 0.029
Crown panel at IL: 0.065
Right side panel at 19R: 0.018
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Had this information been available at the time that the change request was submitted to KHI in
October of 1997 it is unlikely that 0.075 inches from the crown panel and 0.030 from each side
would have been removed. Given these aggressive corrections one would expect the following
process means after the change:
Left side panel at 19L:
Crown panel at IL:
Right side panel at 19R:
0.029 - 0.030 = -0.001
0.065 - 0.075 = -0.010
0.018 - 0.030 = -0.012
The standard deviations from Table 5.4 can be used to show that post-change process should
result in the following panel length distributions:
Left side panel at 19L:
Crown panel at IL:




Crown panels that are consistently 0.080 inches shorter than nominal can only mean that the
trimming process was adjusted by more than 0.075 from the historical mean.
The author has an additional concern that measurement error in the Laser Tracker study is not
available. This may not be an issue but a legitimate question is: how much would the calculated
tooling offsets identified by Schweigert and Watters change if the laser equipment were removed,
reinstalled, and the survey conducted again with a different set of qualified operators?
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8. Chapter 8 - Conclusions and recommendations
The 777 is a monument to the ingenuity, creativity, and intellect of the people who designed and
build it. From an organization standpoint, however, it might be argued that Boeing's intelligence
is less than the sum of its parts. Cumulative genius, for which Boeing possesses the necessary
ingredients, is absent. The 777 has experienced unexpected difficulties in production due in
large part to hardware variability. Learning gleaned from the detailed study conducted during the
internship sheds light on why this is so:
* inadequate consideration was given to production and measurement process capability and
assembly integration risk during product and process design. This caused a production
system that must inherently rely on inspection and rework in order to control variation within
tolerance limits.
* corrective action procedures evolved reactively and are focused on events rather than being
designed into the manufacturing system.
* incentives 2 along the customer-supplier channel are such that variation is washed into areas
that are not inspected by QA and then knowingly passed downstream.
* the effect of accumulated variation culminates in final assembly where it can no longer be
"washed out". At this point it takes tremendous effort to perform root cause corrective action
because of poorly designed and inconsistent measurement systems, large time delays in
information and material flows, and long distances from the original problem source.
2 KHI may have a bias toward trimming "long". The author found further statistical support for this hypothesis in a
study conducted on the 767 forward join which indicated that 767 section 44 forward body panels may on average be
longer than engineering nominal. Another study conducted by the 777 Process Engineering Group showed that 777
frame ends in body panels from KHI were subject to a "riding' condition due to excess frame length.
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8.1 Conclusions
The highest leverage approach to dealing with variation is to design processes that minimize its
magnitude and products so that variation is absorbed in areas where it is inconsequential. This is
often referred to as robust design and results in a reduced need for corrective action. Proper
design includes consistent measurement systems with known uncertainty so that root causes of
problems are quickly pinpointed. Incentives should be aligned so that once the root cause is
determined, everyone in the value chain works together to eradicate it. These pontifications,
however, are of little help to 777 Division where the current level of hardware variation and the
hard requirement to deliver airplanes on-time every-time require that symptomatic problem
solving occur. This leaves line management with little time to conduct root cause investigations
which. the case study demonstrated, take tremendous effort. For this reason, investment in
groups such as the 777 Process Engineering team is vital.
HVC and Process Engineering are foreign to Boeing as it has approached manufacturing in the
past yet they represent the right philosophy for how organizational learning and corrective action
should proceed. HVC and Process Engineering are modeled on tested and proven manufacturing
principles as described by Deming, Taguchi, the Toyota production system and others. A
pervasive barrier to corrective action that the author noted was an imbedded linear mentality and
a fixation on events rather than on systematic and statistical corrective action processes.
Moreover. without better control over hardware variability, Boeing will not reap the intended
benefit from efforts in the area of lean manufacturing. Finally, organizational learning can take
place across product generations by impounding 777 HVC and Process Engineering data into the
design of Boeing's next airplane. HVC and Process Engineering, despite having room for
improvement. address all of these important issues.
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8.2 Recommendations
Recommendations fall along four principle dimensions which overlap29:
* design considerations - integration risk and over-constraints, process capability, temperature
standards, and designed corrective action structures.
* measurement systems and measurement error - measurements that check the intended KC,
quantified measurement uncertainty, integration of HVC and QA where feasible.
* organizational culture and incentive systems - emphasize customer satisfaction, consider the
effect of process improvements on the people who are being asked to produce them,
encourage suppliers to deliver the nominal material condition.
* corrective action processes - get shops involved in tracking their processes, corporate level
support for Process Engineering.
8.2.1 Design considerations
8.2.1.1 Identify integration risk30 and avoid over-constrained assemblies
The chain metrics approach and/or the related DFC described by Cunningham and Whitney
should be incorporated into the design stage to identify integration risk and over-constraints
before production ramp-up begins. Regardless of requirements on paper, there are only six
degrees of freedom in an assembly. This fact should be reflected as a planned constraint in the
29 For example, a key insight of the thesis is that the shop floor culture (of "best fitting" and the basic assumption that
if QA buys the job it must be OK) is a rational response to an over-constrained assembly, lack of prioritization of
KCs, and a management's emphasis on schedule.
30 Integration risk is defined by Cunningham and Whitney as "the risk that apparently properly made elements will
not function as desired when assembled or will require long error correction or adjustment. Integration risk rapidly
spawns cost and schedule risk because integration problems are usually found late in product development and are
hard to diagnose." See Bibliography.
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design. Planning of build sequences to consistently deliver the DFC will free shops from the
necessary "evil" of best fitting.
Once this is done there must be a prioritization or hierarchy of KCs such that the ones that are
most important are delivered. For example, is it more important for final body join to satisfy QA
requirements for skin and seat track station gaps or to align the airplane to make the laser
alignment measurement read nominal (see measurement considerations in Section 8.2.2.1).
Prevailing opinions in production are divided and which criterion is used often depends upon
who happens to be at work the day the airplane is joined. The point is, operators may not know
which effect is a 10-6 impact and which is 103. Without a prioritization framework, however, the
tradeoff decision will be made anecdotally and may vary from one mechanic or one shift to the
next (as a further example see, Section 4.3.4 where two shifts in the same shop compete for the
same six degrees of freedom).
8.2.1.2 Consider existing process capability in the design of engineering tolerances
There was inadequate consideration of production process variability in the design of 777
engineering tolerances. Support for this contention includes the ubiquitous +/-0.030 tolerance on
almost every engineering drawing and the 7 lbs. EOEW NCR requirement (discussed in section
5.2.3) that affects fuel consumption by 0.0004%. Boeing's next airplane should draw on existing
HVC. NCR. QA. or other manufacturing data and design engineering tolerances so that they can
be achieved without rework. Designers should refrain from arbitrarily setting tolerances and ask:
* is the tolerance necessary to achieve design requirements?
* is the existing process or the expected process statistically capable of delivering the design
tolerance?
For example, if final body join 777 QA data indicate that seat track station gaps have +/-3a of
0.080 inches the design of the next airplane should allow that the tolerance be set accordingly or
the processes by which seat track station gaps are delivered should be improved.
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An example to further illustrate the point is described by Professor D. Whitney of MIT as
follows: the length of the section 44 body panels considered in the case study is 398.830 inches
with a tolerance of +/- 0.040 inches which is equivalent to 0.040/398.830 = 0.0001. Now
imagine that it is desired to manufacture aluminum cubes with each side one inch long within a
tolerance of +/- 0.0001 inches (analogous to the body panel tolerance limit). What type of
process would be required to deliver such accuracy and precision? What type of temperature
controls would be necessary? What kind of measurement systems and measurement uncertainty
would be demanded? Are Boeing's processes consistent with what is required?
8.2.1.3 Consider temperature effects
The lack of a defensible temperature standard is potentially a large source of variation (see
Section 4.3.2). Boeing should set a standard temperature at which the nominal dimension is to
be achieved.
8.2.1.4 Plan for corrective action
Finally. plan for corrective action in the design of products and processes. Work by Cunningham
shows that corrective action at Ford Motor Company, for example, works well because there is a
design framework upon which it is based. Corrective action in final assembly will proceed more
smoothly if mutually agreed upon measurement systems with common indexing and datuming
and known uncertainty are in place before problems arise.
8.2.2 Measurement systems
8.2.2.1 Quantify measurement error
Measurement error should be measured and quantified in existing and new designs. Process
capability studies for measurement systems is badly needed and measurements should be planned
so that they check for the intended feature (see Section 4.3.4, Section 5.2.3, Section 7.2, etc.).
For example. using skin and seat track gaps as a proxy for airplane alignment is not a robust way
to deliver straight airplanes because the body sections have accumulated variation. Work by 777
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Process Engineering indicates that some body panels are trapezoidal which drives additional
variation into airplane straightness if alignment is based on skin gap. Thus the laser alignment
system is an excellent approach to achieve a top level airplane characteristic that represents a
source of pride for many people in the 777 manufacturing program and a source of satisfaction to
airline customers.
On the other hand, laser alignment data in Section 5.2.3 reveal a level of dispersion that should
not be ignored. A measurement capability study is needed to better understand how much of this
is due to alignment and how much is measurement noise. Moreover, the lack of certainty with
measured values creates conflicting demands for assembly personnel and contentious debate that
sometimes divides workers.
8.2.2.2 Integrate HVC and QA measurements where possible
Potential cost savings may accrue if Boeing can better integrate QA personnel and the
measurements that they perform into the workshop environment. There seems to be considerable
overlap between QA and HVC and eliminating or streamlining redundant measurements may be
prudent. For example. it was shown in Section 5.2.2 that QA and HVC data for aft join skin gaps
are identical. Using QA data in the HVC system may also improve the quality and status of HVC
measurements (Sections 3.1.4 and 4.3.4.1 show why this is important).
8.2.2.3 Eliminate non-value added HVC measurements
Elimination of non-value added HVC measurements is being pursued with vigor by 777 Process
Engineering. Section 4.3.4 and Chapter 5 present evidence that this work must continue if HVC
is to succeed in confering economic benefit to the 777 program. Additionally, a credible HVC
data base will be a powerful knowledge transfer vehicle for the next Boeing airplane program to
build upon.
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8.2.2.4 Use control charts (or some other method of assessing process performance) to reduce
the number of measurements taken
Cunningham 3" describes how Ford Motor Company manages the need to obtain information
amidst mountains of data. This is accomplished by reducing the number of measurements as
soon as a process is demonstrated as capable.
8.2.3 Organizational culture and incentives
8.2.3.1 Make customer satisfaction a priority
This requires top management support but it will take more than words to drive the message
home. Boeing is keenly aware of the importance of delighting its external customers. The
company also has a military-like ability to align and mobilize its employees. Leaders should take
advantage of these strengths to develop a clearer focus on the needs of internal customers.
8.2.3.2 Encourage vendors to deliver the nominal material condition
The thesis did not discuss the Taguchi loss function but there is abundant literature on the
subject. A process that is off-center results in a loss even if the feature part is within tolerance.
Vendors should be encouraged to set their processes to deliver the nominal material condition
without "leaving a little extra on" just in case.
Vendors are afraid that if a part that is too small Boeing will have no alternative other than to
reject it12. Moreover, Boeing demonstrates a willingness to trim parts when they are slightly
oversized. This establishes an incentive for vendors to hedge against uncertainty by trimming
long at a significant aggregate cost to Boeing. Until suppliers feel the pain that they are causing
they have no reason to change.
A Page 65 of Master's thesis, see bibliography.
12 KHI stated plainly to the author during the case study that "it is better to be a little long than too short. You can
always trim a little bit off but you can't put material back on".
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Implicit within this recommendation is a link between Lean as embraced by Boeing and
HVC/Process Engineering. Lean says never to knowingly ship an out of tolerance part;
HVC/Process Engineering data provide the information and analysis necessary to fix the root
cause so that the problem doesn't happen again.
8.2.3.3 Integrate HVC and "lean" activities
The lean initiative is often met with cynicism on the shop floor. One reason is that hardware
variation is so large that it is difficult for workers to imagine continuous flow. From a
mechanic's perspective, what difference does it make if you save two minutes per shift by kitting
parts but then have to wait three days to get an NCR through the system?
Without better control over hardware variability, lean activities will not achieve the intended
goals (also see Section 8.2.3.2).
8.2.4 Existing corrective action process
8.2.4.1 Strengthen feedback loops by involving shops in tracking their processes
Encourage workstations to get involved in corrective action. Shops should keep track of their
processes and problems, do some control charting, and be able to answer simple questions such
as:
* which airplanes had frame station mismatches, which frames were the mismatches on, and
how much were they off by?
* which airplanes had a keel short edge margin?
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It was nearly impossible for the author to get answers for even simple questions such as these
during the internship using in place systems such as NCR records. This was true despite the
existence of formal groups and information systems formally tasked to facilitate this type of
feedback. The lack of viable feedback links to upstream build areas poses a formidable barrier to
process improvement.
8.2.4.2 Support for groups that concentrate on root cause problem solving and help position
the organization for knowledge transfer
In the current 777 manufacturing environment, management is appropriately committed and
challenged to meet short-term delivery obligations. Consequently, operational management is
extremely pragmatic and focused on immediate results. As the internship case study showed,
however. root cause problem solving takes tremendous time and effort. This fact often places the
short-term needs of the factory in conflict with the long-term needs of Boeing.
Only fundamental approaches to corrective action that address underlying causes will improve
the current manufacturing situation because symptomatic approaches do not prevent problems
from recurring. Moreover, to improve in the future, it is necessary to transfer the knowledge that
resides within the production organization today into the design of tomorrow's airplanes.
HVC and Process Engineering programs at 777 represent a beginning step toward building the
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Appendix 5: Sample KHI KC data spreadsheet
GROUPID IPTID MEAS UPSPEC I LWRSPEC ENG NOM PHYSPART IAP NO MEAS DT TIME I LOTN I SERIAL TOOL UNIT I SSN ACTION I MISSING VAID CLCALC I UERY
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
KC 5 KHI 7
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Back-shop - a build position or control code located upstream in the factory. This is a relative
term casually used to refer to any of a number of upstream suppliers.
Best fitting - process by which production workers attempt to satisfy mutually exclusive
requirements in an over-constrained assembly. This occurs because building the part according
to the design build plan will cause features at other critical interfaces to fall outside of their
allowable tolerance limits resulting in production delays and rework. If it is possible to avoid
these problems with small undocumented departures from the design build plan and bring the
nonconformance condition within tolerance workers often take it upon themselves to do so.
These effects are caused by variation in the manufacturing processes.
BL - buttock line. Line parallel to the center line of the airplane fuselage. Measured in inches
from the center of the aircraft outboard to the left or right as viewed from the rear of the airplane.
CC - control code. Build position, shop, or workstation that is tasked with producing a
subassembly. assembly. or installation in its deliverable condition.
CC131 - Final body join or FBJ. Work station responsible for joining the forward and aft bodies
of the airplane to the wing center section.
CC335 - section 44 build shop. Responsible for assembling the wing center stub from the
component assemblies as shown in figure 3.2.
Corrective action - formal process by which any condition that could affect airplane safety,
service life. operating costs, or maintainability are resolved before the airplane is delivered.
Anything requiring corrective action is reviewed by QA, Engineering, and Manufacturing to
ensure that the product is not compromised with respect to these requirements.
Datum - plane or axis that is assumed to be exact for purposes of measurement. Most geometric
features are measured relative to datum features.
Effectivity - number assigned to an airplane in production to identify basic engineering
configuration. Effectivity numbers are unique to a particular airplane and are of the form
WA001. WB076, WY997, etc.
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EOEW - equivalent operating empty weight. The weight in pounds that would have to be added
to an airplane to cause an equivalent fuel burn effect as some other change that cannot be directly
measured in weight. For example, a mispositioned exterior surface may cause a drag penalty
resulting in increased fuel bum which can be converted to an EOEW and then compared or
ranked against something else. Boeing considers EOEW less than 7 lbs. to be insignificant. The
757 aerodynamic study in Section 5.2.3 indicates that a 1 pound increase in EOEW results in an
additional fuel burn of 15.7 gallons per year.
EOP - end of panel
FHI - Fuji Heavy Industries. Japanese industrial partner to Boeing responsible for assembling the
section 44 center stub (section 11/45) and supplying other parts.
FAJ - floor assembly jig. Large stationary tool used to hold and locate parts during assembly
flowdown - process in which key elements (i.e., engineering datums, key characteristics, and
part-to-tool or part-to-part indexes) are tiered down through the drawing and build trees in a
structured relationship to ensure continuity from installation to the detail level.
Greenline - form used to carry authorization for rework required by an NCR to other airplanes
when a recurring condition exists.
HVC - hardware variability control. Cross functional management of design and build processes
that impact the fit, performance, and service life of airplane hardware.
Integration Risk - the risk that apparently properly made elements will not function as desired
when assembled or will require long error correction or adjustment. Integration risk rapidly
spawns cost and schedule risk because integration problems are usually found late in product
development and are hard to diagnose.
KC - key characteristic. Attributes or features (dimensions, specifications) of a material, part,
assembly, installation, or system in which variation from nominal has the most adverse effect
upon fit, performance, or service life.
KC.5.KHI.7 - KC measurement performed in the KHI Seaside plant FAJ to determine the aft
skin edge station location of section 44 body panels.
KC.5.335.7 - KC measurement performed in the CC335 FAJs to determine the aft skin edge
station location of section 44 body panels.
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KHI - Kawasaki Heavy Industries. Japanese industrial partner to Boeing responsible for
supplying section 44 body panels and other parts.
LBL11 - left buttock line 11.00. The reference buttock line corresponding to the LBL 11 seat
track that serves as the BL datum for the 777. LBL11 was selected as the BL datum because it
coincided with a hardware feature to which airplane parts could be indexed during the build
process.
Line Number - unique number assigned to an airplane to identify its relative position within the
planned airplane delivery order.
L/N - line number.
Misfair - Condition due to hardware variation in which two panel edges that are designed to be
flush are slightly displaced relative to each other. An overhead diagram of such a condition is
shown in Figure 5.1.
MHI - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Japanese industrial partner to Boeing responsible for
supplying section 46 body panels and other parts.
MRB - material review board. Representatives from Engineering and QA who determine how
nonconformance conditions will be dispositioned (i.e. what will be done to correct the
nonconformance).
NCR - nonconformance reject also referred to as nonconformance reject tag or simply tag.
Documentation providing traceability for a part, system, or process that does not comply with
current specifications.
O&IR - operating and inspection requirement. A job in the production phase of an assembly that
must be documented and completed before the build cycle can considered finished.
Over-constrained assembly - assembly step that attempts to control more attributes than what is
physically possible. Over-constrained conditions arise because the location of a given feature on
a rigid structure cannot be independently changed without changing the location of other features
on the same part. Only a perfect part in a perfect assembly will have all features match exactly.
QA - quality assurance.
RAJ - rivet assembly jig. Tooling fixture used to hold and locate parts during assembly
operations.
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SME - shipping mechanical equipment. Large metal shipping fixture used to contain airplane
assemblies during transport.
Station - identifies one or a range of edge views of vertical reference planes that divide the
airplane into transverse sections. Station is measured in inches from the nose of the airplane aft.
STA - station.
Waterline - line parallel to the horizontal reference line of the airplane used to reference vertical
locations. The waterline reference begins at ground level and is measured in inches in the
upward direction.
WL - waterline.
WL200 - Waterline 200.00. The waterline datum for the 777 corresponding to the top surface of
the LBLI I seat track. WL200 was selected as the WL datum because it coincided with a
hardware feature from which the airplane parts can also be indexed.
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Appendix 7: Tutorial on datum flow chain
Datum flow chains
A datum flow chain is a directed acyclic graphical (a graph with no loops or cycles)
representation of an assembly with nodes representing the parts and arcs representing
dimensional relationship between them. (See Fig. 1) Every node represents a part or a fixture
and every arc transfers dimensional constraint from the part at the tail to that at the head. The
number shown on the arc indicates the number of degrees of freedom constrained by the arc. A
typical part is joined with several parts in an assembly. However every joint does not transfer
dimensional constraint and determine the location of the part. Some joints are redundant and are
there to provide strength or support (called "contacts"). The joints that define dimensional
relationships between parts are called "mates". If these distinctions can be expressed carefully
and mathematically, then we can construct directed graph representations for dimensional
transfer in a declarative way, providing a basis for synthesizing tolerance achievement rather than
doing tolerance analysis on sets of geometric decisions whose underlying logic we have no way
to represent. We call this directed graph of "mates" the datumflow chain that assigns a hierarchy
to the joints between parts by defining which part(s) locates which other part(s) in the assembly.
Contacts are shown here as dashed lines only for the sake of clarity. Loops or cycles in a DFC
would mean that a part locates itself once the entire cycle is traversed, and hence are not
permitted in a DFC.
A DFC is constructed for each assembly station. The red dashed curved lines show the transfer of
index points (datum shifts) across assembly stations. During assembly operations, mates are
directly associated with the delivery of KCs. Hence a DFC can be used to track the delivery of
KCs in an assembly process.
A typical DFC has only one node that has no arcs directed towards it, which would represent the
part from which the assembly process would begin. This is similar in logic to the base part. Every
arc constrains certain degrees of freedom depending upon the type of mating conditions it
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represents. The sum of the degrees of freedom constrained by all the incoming arcs to a node
should be equal to six unless there are some kinematic properties in the assembly or designed
mating conditions such as slip joints which can accommodate some amount of pre-determined
motion. A sum greater that six would mean that the part is over-constrained. Pre-stressing or
other finessing of an over-constrained part may be required in order to complete assembly.
The construction of a DFC is explained using the following example:
In Fig. 1. the example of a side skin panel of a 43 section is used to illustrate the construction
and interpretation of a DFC. In Fig. 1(a) is shown a typical skin stringer assembly. The skin has
pre-drilled holes which are used to match assemble the stringers. The lower edge of the skin was
used as a primary reference datum when the holes on the skin were drilled and as a primary
locating index when the stringers are assembled to the skin. This information is represented using
a DFC in Fig. (b). The skin is represented as a node and has arrows directed towards nodes
representing stringers. This means that the location of all the stringers in the resulting assembly is
determined by the datums on the skin. A separate node is used to represent Str. 27 just to
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Fig. 1: Example construction of a DFC -- (a) a typical skin stringer assembly, part of a side
skin panel of a 43 section -- (b) the DFC for the assembly in (a) -- (c) assembly process of the
two panels constituting a 43 section side skin panel -- (d) the DFC for the assembly process
shown in (c).
The next stage of the assembly process is the assembly of the two skin panels to form the side
skin super panel. on a fixture (called RAJ at KHI), as shown in Fig. 1(c) . The two skin panels
are indexed off the RAJ by using Str.20 on the upper panel and Str.29 on the lower panel as
locating indexes during assembly. Once the RAJ has located the two skin panels, they are
fastened together to form a lap joint. This process is represented using the DFC shown in Fig.
1(d). In addition to the datum flow, the measurement process is also represented by
supplementing the DFC with measurement flow information (shown in purple).
The DFC can also capture and represent the shift of datums and indexes from one assembly
station to another, if they occur during assembly. The red dashed curved lines (Fig. 1) show the
transfer of index points across assembly stations. The existence of such datum shifts mean that
the accuracy of the resulting assembly at any assembly station is not just a function of the
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operations performed at that station but also on the assembly operations performed at prior
assembly stations. For example, in the example illustrated in Fig. 1, the accuracy of the resulting
super skin panel assembly depends on the accuracy of the location of Str.20 and Str.29 with
respect to the skin edge at assembly station-I. The DFC captures this information explicitly and
enables the designer to determine which assembly operations done at prior assembly stations
need to be monitored.
Another important consequence is the ability to derive the tolerance chain for any KC from the
DFC. Most often current CAD systems represent only the final configuration of the assembly and
hence tolerance analysis is performed only on the final configuration of the assembly. However
to perform a meaningful analysis, all the intermediate stages of the assembly process should also
be considered and all the fixtures used during the intermediate stages of the assembly process
should an integral part of the analysis. The DFC naturally leads to the construction of the
tolerance chains that includes all the contributors to dimensional variation. A tolerance chain
between any two parts A and B is a path of solid lines traced out from the node representing part
A to the node representing part B in the DFC.
What follows .from the above discussions is a very interesting observation that the DFC passes
through the supply chain for the assembly. A tolerance chain between two parts in the same
subassembly can cross organizational barriers, depending upon the choice of location and
indexing methods employed. To perform any kind of meaningful tolerance analysis, knowledge
of the assembly procedures at supplier sites is very essential to determine all the variation
contributing elements. Using the DFC, all the contributing elements to any tolerance chain can be
correctly determined.
This is illustrated by the following example. Say we wish to determine the position and
orientation of the edge of the lower skin relative to the breakrings on the side skin panel at CC
320 (Boeing). The resulting tolerance chain is shown in Fig. 2. Thus, the tolerance chain between
two parts in the side skin subassembly at Boeing passes through fixtures at KHI and back to
Boeing.
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Fig. 2: Tolerance chain derivation from a DFC
Each directed arrow in a DFC can be represented mathematically using 4x4 coordinate
transformation matrices. [T1] is a 4x4 transformation matrix from the coordinate frame on the
part at the tail of the arc to the coordinate frame on the part on the head of the arc, as shown in
Fig. 4. [T,] includes the effect of the variations involved in these coordinate frames. With this
tool the designer is now able to include completely all the contributors to the tolerance chain and
model what really is happening during assembly.
The procedure employed to arrive at this result is explained as follows. This example builds on
the example in Fig. I and looks at the next stage of the assembly process (the step after Fig. 1(d))















Fig. 3: The DFC for the assembly operations in which the frames and breakrings are added.
At final assembly (Boeing) the above assembly is indexed using the breakrings on a fixture (FAJ















Fig. 4: DFC for final stage assembly of the side skin panel at CC 320
To determine the position and orientation the edge of the lower skin relative to the breakrings, all
that needs to be done is to trace the DFC (solid lines) from the breakrings to lower skin edge and
the path constitutes the tolerance chain. There is no direct path in Fig. 3, of solid lines -- which
carry dimensional constraint -- between the breakrings and the lower skin. This means that the
path from the breakrings to the lower skin passes through a set of fixtures and parts at an earlier
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assembly operation. The path starts from the breakrings (Fig. 3), passes through the FAJ at KHI
(Fig. 3), Str. 27 and finally to the lower skin (Fig. 3). The resulting tolerance chain is shown in
Fig. 2. Any kind of tolerance analysis that ignores the effects of the FAJ at KHI in the tolerance
analysis will not yield accurate results.
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